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MUSEUMS IN THE CROSSHAIRS: UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
JENNIFER ANGLIM KREDER

 
KIMBERLY DEGRAAF
 
ABSTRACT 
Congress has passed ineffectual, “sound bite” anti-terrorism 
legislation that has foisted conflicting jurisdictional mandates upon the 
federal courts, sucked terrorist victims into a vacuous, exhausting drama 
with no chance for justice, and interfered with the President‟s ability to 
conduct diplomatic relations in the Middle East. One group of victims is 
mired in multiple jurisdictions trying to enforce a default judgment, 
exorbitant by international standards, against the Islamic Republic of Iran 
by forcing auctions of antiquities collections housed at Harvard 
University, the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago, the Field 
Museum of Natural History (Chicago), and the Museum of Fine Arts 
(Boston) among others. Congress in this political posturing has triggered 
the Department of Justice to participate in the litigation counter to the 
victims‟ interests. The victims likely feel ignored and maligned by their 
own president, while Congress all along was the master puppeteer of their 
false hopes. This Article analyzes the legislation and litigation and 
concludes that Congress should leave the ever-changing war on terror to 
the executive branch and that the artifacts should not be auctioned—even 
to satisfy the plaintiffs, the most deserving of victims.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The origin of the phrase ―Politics makes strange bedfellows‖ is 
attributed to Shakespeare,
1
 and life is imitating art in a bizarre group of 
cases that has pitted innocent victims of a 1997 Hamas terrorist attack 
against some of the nation‘s most respected institutions and people,2 which 
some view as ―Pillars of Society.‖3 Congress has foisted jurisdiction upon 
the federal courts via ―terrorism amendments‖ to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (―FSIA‖),4 which has sucked a large number of terrorist 
victims into a vacuous, exhausting drama with little to no chance for 
justice. These victims are mired in multiple jurisdictions trying to enforce 
a $71 million default judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran by 
forcing auctions of antiquities collections housed at Harvard University, 
 
 
 1. RALPH KEYES, THE QUOTE VERIFIER 171 (2006). 
 2. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 541 F. Supp. 2d 416 (D. Mass. 2008) (Harvard University, 
Museum of Fine Arts–Boston); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 C 9370, 2008 WL 192321 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008) (Oriental Institute of University of Chicago, Field Museum of Natural 
History, Department of Justice). The prior and subsequent history in these cases is extensive and 
omitted from this footnote in the interest of clarity, but these two opinions are at the core of the 
disputes concerning ancient Persian artifacts in museums. See also Patty Gerstenblith & Lucille 
Roussin, International Cultural Property, 41 INT‘L LAW. 613, 624–26 (2007) (generally discussing the 
claims and mentioning now dismissed cases against the University of Michigan Museum of Art and 
Kelsey Museum of Archaeology and Detroit Institute of Arts); Travis Sills, Judicial Conversion of 
Culture: Attaching Embodiments of Ancient Culture to Judgments in Civil Proceedings, in YEARBOOK 
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW 237 (Sherry Hutt ed., 2007) (generally discussing the claims).  
 3. The Pillars of Society is a play written in 1877 by Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen; its 
premise is that the rich and powerful are often selfish and corrupt. 3 MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF WORLD DRAMA 9 (Stanley Hochman ed., 1984). 
 4. See infra Part II. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/3
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the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago, the Field Museum of 
Natural History (Chicago), and the Museum of Fine Arts (Boston) among 
others.
5
 Moreover, Congress, in this political posturing, unwisely 
interfered with the President‘s ability to conduct diplomatic relations in 
the Middle East and triggered the Department of Justice to participate in 
the litigation counter to the victims‘ interests.6 The victims likely feel 
ignored and maligned by their own president, while Congress all along 
was the master puppeteer of their false hopes.
7
  
This Article posits that Congress should leave the ever-changing war 
on terror to the executive branch and that the artifacts should not be 
auctioned—even to satisfy the judgments obtained by the plaintiffs, the 
most deserving of victims. Part II provides context necessary to 
understand the litigation at issue and the consequences thereof. Part III 
delves into legal analysis of the applicable statutory provisions. Part IV 
examines British court decisions regarding other Iranian artifacts, which 
could potentially impact the U.S. litigation. Part V concludes that 
members of Congress acted in their own political self-interest in passing 
 
 
 5. See supra note 2. The overarching judgment was $300 million, see Campuzano v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 274–79 (D.D.C. 2003), but only $71.5 million is enforceable 
against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Gerstenblith & Roussin, supra note 2, at 624. 
 6. E.g., Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community: Civil Lawsuits as the 
Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 307 (2009) 
(discussing all ―terrorism legislation‖ enacted since 1991). See also Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, ___ 
U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2183 (2009) (discussing presidential waiver of Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
jurisdiction against Iraq); Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. Elahi, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1732 (2009) (demonstrating interaction between arbitral awards 
and default terrorism judgments); Alicia M. Hilton, Terror Victims at the Museum Gates: Testing the 
Commercial Activity Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 53 VILL. L. REV. 479 
(2008) (analyzing Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act commercial activity exception aspects of the 
earlier stages of the Rubin litigation).  
 7. S. Jason Baletsa, Note, The Cost of Closure: A Reexamination of the Theory and Practice of 
the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1293 (2000) 
(―The practical result of U.S. intervention, from the perspective of the victims‘ families, is that the 
United States has sided with the terrorist nation against them.‖ (footnote omitted)); Brian Blomquist, 
Grieving Dad: Prez Boosts Terror, N.Y. POST, Sept. 27, 1999, at 15 (discussing regrets of one parent 
of a woman who perished in a terrorist attack of ever having initiated litigation against the Islamic 
Republic of Iran); see also Sean P. Vitrano, Note, Hell Bent on Awarding Recovery to Terrorism 
Victims: The Evolution and Application of the Antiterrorism Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 19 DICK. J. INT‘L L. 213, 213–14 (2000) (―President Clinton publicly pledged his 
support for the families of the victims of terrorism, [but] his Administration subsequently worked to 
undermine the effectiveness of the new [legislation].‖); Josh Gerstein, Justice Dept. „Helps Iran‟ in 
Court Case, N.Y. SUN, Nov. 23, 2007, at National 1, available at http://www.nysun.com/national/ 
justice-dept-helps-iran-in-court-case/66872/ (quoting plaintiffs‘ counsel: ―Congress said, ‗Go do this.‘ 
We do it and now the [executive] branch stands in the way‖). See generally William P. Hoye, Fighting 
Mire with . . . Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT‘L L. 105, 129 (2002) (discussing presidential national security waiver provision). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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―sound bite‖ legislation8 at the expense of terrorism victims, foisted 
conflicting jurisdictional mandates upon the federal courts and, in the 
future, should leave the fast-changing war on terror, at least in regard to 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the executive branch.  
II. BACKGROUND 
As a result of the cases, known collectively as the ―Rubin‖ cases, 
Harvard University, the University of Chicago, the University of 
Michigan, the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago, the Detroit 
Institute of Arts, the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, and the U.S. 
Department of Justice have aligned with the Republic of Iran to prevent 
the victims from enforcing their $251 million default judgment by forcing 
an auction of antiquities unearthed in the cradle of civilization.
9
 President 
Barack Obama has been petitioned by Iranian-Americans, most of whom 
likely fled the post-Shah regime, to join the coalition supporting Iran,
10
 
one of the three rogue nations forming what President George W. Bush 
dubbed the ―Axis of Evil.‖11 Standing against this alliance are a handful of 
U.S. citizens, including young study-abroad students horrifically injured 
by the attack
12
 and an advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu who 
testified as to the link between Hamas and Iran.
13
 Moreover, a group of 
victims of a different attack, the 1983 Hezbollah marine barracks bombing 
in Beirut, Lebanon, hold a $2.5 billion default judgment against Iran.
14
 
These victims have entered the legal fray in the Rubin cases, asserting a 
 
 
 8. Cf. Bobby Scott et al., Juvenile Justice: Reform After One Hundred Years, 37 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1409, 1414 (2000) (stating that Congress is more interested in ―tough-on-crime sound bites‖ than 
effectively tackling the difficult problems surrounding juvenile justice).  
 9. E.g., Courtney Campbell, Note, Arts and Arms: An Examination of the Looting of the 
National Museum of Iraq, 32 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 424 (2009) (using term ―Cradle of 
Civilization‖ to refer to Iraq, Iran, and the surrounding region). 
 10. Goli Fassihian, Appeal for Protection of Persian Artifacts Reaches New Heights, NAT‘L 
IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle& 
id=5502. 
 11. In 2002, President Bush called Iran, Iraq, and North Korea the ―Axis of Evil‖ in his State of 
the Union Address, ―an obvious twist on the Axis Powers in World War II (i.e., Germany, Italy, and 
Japan) and the Evil Empire speech of Ronald Reagan against the Soviet Union.‖ NANCY S. LIND & 
BERNARD I. TAMAS, CONTROVERSIES OF THE GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENCY 131, 145–46 (2007). 
 12. Rubin v. Hamas—Islamic Resistance Movement, No. CIV. A. 02-0975(RMU), 2004 WL 
2216489, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (first opinion in lengthy lawsuit discussed below).  
 13. Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261–62 (D.D.C. 2003). This 
case was later consolidated with one of the cases in the Rubin litigation discussed below. Id. at 261. 
Unless otherwise noted, both the Campuzano plaintiffs and the Rubin plaintiffs will be collectively 
referred to as ―the plaintiffs‖ or ―the Rubin plaintiffs‖ throughout this Article.  
 14. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2007) (awarding damages); 
Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2003) (default judgment). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/3
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competing claim to the proceeds of any future sale of the antiquities at 
issue.
15
 The 1983 attack resulted in 241 American casualties, the largest 
number of American lives lost in a terrorist act until September 11, 2001.
16
 
―The resulting explosion was the largest non-nuclear explosion that had 
ever been detonated on the face of the Earth.‖17 The war on terror18 has 
made strange bedfellows, indeed.  
The attacks certainly terrorized innocents. In 1997, three Hamas 
terrorists detonated suicide bombs packed ―with nails, screws, pieces of 
glass, and chemical poisons to cause maximum pain, suffering, and death‖ 
in a crowded Jerusalem marketplace.
19
 The attack killed five people and 
injured more than two hundred.
20
 Eight of the Rubin plaintiffs were among 
the severely wounded.
21
 They experienced pain and suffering beyond 
adequate description and will probably never truly recover from the 
resulting post-traumatic stress while struggling tremendously simply to go 
through life each day.
22
 Four of the plaintiffs are family members who care 
for injured victims.
23
 All are U.S. citizens.
24
 
Descriptions of terrorism victims‘ horrible injuries are ―stories that 
supply the necessary human dimension to the stark, horrifying skeleton of 
the bombing itself.‖25 All of the injured victims suffer from Post-
 
 
 15. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2007); Peterson v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, No. C 08-80030-MISC JSW, 2008 WL 5046327 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008). See also 
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370, 2008 WL 2531197, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2008) 
(granting a motion to strike the Peterson plaintiffs‘ application to appear pro hac vice, appearance, and 
motion to dismiss); Order Granting Motion to Intervene, Rubin, 2008 WL 2531197 (No. 03 CV 9370) 
(granting Peterson plaintiffs‘ subsequent motion to intervene) (on file with author).  
 16. Robert C. McFarlane, From Beirut to 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at A37, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/opinion/23mcfarlane.html; The President‟s News Conference, 
Transcript of Bush‟s Remarks on Iraq: “We Will Finish the Work of the Fallen”, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2004, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/14/politics/14BTEX.html. 
 17. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 18. The phrase ―war on terror‖ was a hallmark of President Bush‘s administration, which 
―adopted the phrase soon after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to capture the scope of the threat it perceived 
and the military operations that would be required to confront it.‖ Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, „Global 
War on Terror‟ Is Given New Name, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, at A4, available at http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html; see also OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM (2003), available at http://www. 
upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/govt_docs/public_health_prep/whitehouse/whitehouse_nation 
al_strategy_for_combating_terrorism.html; JIM A. KUYPERS, BUSH‘S WAR 4, 21–34 (2006).  
 19. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 261. The facts alleged here are from this opinion containing 
findings of fact supporting the entry of a default judgment against Iran.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 263–68. 
 23. Id. at 261. 
 24. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 263–68. 
 25. Damarrell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 108 (D.D.C. 2003) (default 
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Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), common symptoms of which include 
―paranoia, fear, emotional reactions to news of other terrorist attacks, and 
depression.‖26  
Their individual stories should be known.
27
 Diana Campuzano‘s skin 
burned while her ―brain leaked cerebral spinal fluid from a massive skull 
fracture, and she was blind and hearing impaired.‖28 During her five-hour 
craniotomy, her anterior skull base fracture was repaired with ―mini plates, 
bone cement, and her own harvested tissue.‖29 Her ―recovery‖ was delayed 
as a life-threatening infection spread throughout her body.
30
 ―Photographs 
demonstrate the startling difference in her appearance before and after the 
explosion.‖31 Avi Elishis, who had just graduated from high school, 
―suffered from lacerations and multiple entry wounds from the bomb 
shrapnel, a ruptured eardrum, and first- and second-degree burns covering 
his body.‖32 He went into shock, had a two-inch screw removed from his 
spleen, and underwent surgeries to recover shrapnel that perforated his 
 
 
judgment issued after six days of hearings concerning 1983 Beirut Hezbollah car bombing that killed 
sixty-three people, including seventeen U.S. citizens, and injured more than one hundred other 
people). The gruesome reality of a terrorist attack should be acknowledged here. 
The [1997] explosion ripped the bodies of the bombers apart, leaving limbs and torsos lying 
on the street and spattering the walls of buildings with blood. The people they killed were 
identified as two young women and a 12-year-old girl, and a managed 48. Hospital officials 
said most of the injuries were either caused by shrapnel or flames. 
Serge Schmemann, Bombing in Jerusalem: The Overview; 3 Bombers in Suicide Attack Kill 4 on 
Jerusalem Street in Another Blow to Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1997, at A1, A14, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/05/world/3-bombers-in-suicide-attack-kill-4-on-jerusalem-street-in-
another-blow-to-peace.html (―Officials said eight people were severely wounded, and about 180 others 
were also hurt.‖); Charles M. Sennott, Suicide Bombs Take Heavy Toll in Jerusalem 7 Die, Nearly 200 
Hurt; Hopes for Peace Dim Again, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 5, 1997, at A1 (―Orthodox members of the 
Jewish burial society meticulously gathered blood and human fragments. They acted in accordance 
with Jewish tradition that the entire body is sacred and all remains must be buried within 24 hours.‖). 
A local proprietor who was lucky enough to have just re-entered his store prior to the blast relayed: ―I 
saw bodies and people hurt and screaming . . . . It‘s the worst thing I‘ve ever seen. I am a very strong 
person but I couldn‘t help much.‖ Storer H. Rowley, Netanyahu Tells Arafat Bombings Are Last 
Straw, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 1997, at 1, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-09-
05/news/9709050315_1_lebanon-raid-israeli-jet-fighters-united-nations-interim-force.  
 26. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 265. 
 27. The Campuzano case filed by plaintiffs Diana Campuzano, Avi Elishis, and Gregg Salzman 
was consolidated with the Rubin case filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by 
plaintiffs Jenny Rubin, Daniel Miller, Abraham Mendelson, Stuart Hesch, Noam Rozenman, Deborah 
Rubin, Renay Frym, Elena Rozenman, and Tzvi Rozenman on August 2, 2002. Campuzano v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 28. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 263. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 264. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/3
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lung and three screws lodged next to his heart.
33
 Another screw was later 
removed from his foot, but one remains lodged under his rib.
34
 Gregg 
Salzman was a chiropractor who now suffers debilitating headaches and is 
in constant pain as he struggles to work part-time after undergoing root 
canals, tooth extractions, and having a titanium implant inserted into his 
gums.
35
 Nerve damage spread to his brain and is not treatable except via 
counseling to help him ―live with [the] pain.‖36 Jenny Rubin was 
diagnosed with ―elective mutism, a psychiatric pain condition,‖ and 
permanent tinnitus.
37
 Daniel Miller was a recent high school graduate who 
was impaled by a spike in his left leg, nuts and bolts in both ankles, and a 
piece of glass in his eye; he now suffers from a permanent limp, numbing 
and tingling in his foot, a hematoma, nerve damage, and hypersensitivity 
to sunlight, and he can no longer walk more than twenty minutes at a 
time.
38
 Abraham Mendelson, a study-abroad student who had to endure 
nine hours before being able to be treated, suffered ―multiple shrapnel-
caused entry wounds in his legs, burns that included a burned cornea, . . . a 
partially-severed ear,‖ and a punctured ear drum.39 Stuart Hersh suffered 
multiple entry wounds and burns, and when his ―nightmares and other 
problems arising from his PTSD had become overwhelming,‖ he 
attempted to commit suicide on the one-year anniversary of the attack.
40
  
Noam Rozenman, a high school junior at the time, was perhaps the 
most seriously injured.
41
 He suffered ―burns covering forty percent of his 
body and over 100 shrapnel-caused entry wounds.‖42 ―He spent six weeks 
in the hospital and underwent daily burn treatments.‖43 ―His burn recovery 
period was twice the normal length, because the chemicals inside the 
bombs caused increased body damage.‖44 Noam learned to walk again 
with substantial therapy, and, a year later, he underwent additional surgery 
to ―adjust a steel plate in his leg and to treat his perforated eardrums.‖45 He 
has significant permanent injuries and impaired motor skills; he will 
 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 264. 
 35. Id. at 265. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 266. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 266–67. 
 41. Id. at 267. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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always walk with a limp because one of his legs is now shorter than the 
other.
46
 As previously mentioned, all of the victims who were present 
suffered PTSD, but Noam‘s emotional injuries were so debilitating that it 
was clinically inadvisable for him even to testify.
47
  
The rest of the plaintiffs are family members of those who were 
physically hit by the bomb blasts, but they too suffered greatly from the 
reverberations. Renay Frym is Stuart Hersh‘s wife, but she ―now acts as 
his nurse rather than his wife.‖48 Deborah Rubin, Elena Rozenman, and 
Tzvi Rozenman are parents who have dedicated their time and effort to 
care for their injured children and suffer from grief, anguish, depression, 
chronic fatigue, headaches, agitation, rejection, hypersensitivity, anxiety, 
irritable bowel syndrome, and generalized joint pain and stiffness.
49
  
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
and innumerable news reports, Iran has provided support to Hamas by 
means of money and terrorist training.
50
 Iran failed to appear in the court 
proceedings, which resulted in a default judgment totaling in excess of 
$410 million, including compensatory damages in the amount of $71.5 
million for the Rubin plaintiffs and $39.5 million for the Campuzano 
plaintiffs.
51
 However, as punitive damages were blocked by foreign 
sovereign immunity, only the compensatory portion of the roughly $410 
million judgment is enforceable against Iran.
52
  
 
 
 46. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 267. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 268. 
 49. Id. at 267–68. 
 50. Id. at 262. Dr. Bruce Tefft, a terrorism expert, testified that in 1995 Iran provided $30 million 
in Hamas support. Id. Dr. Patrick Clawson, another expert, testified that over the past ten years, Iran 
annually has provided between $20 million and $50 million to Hamas. Id. See also Steven Erlanger, 
Iran Pledges Financial Aid To Hamas-Led Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at A12, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/23/international/middleeast/23mideast.html; John Kifner, Roots of 
Terror: A Special Report; Alms & Arms: Tactics in a Holy War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at 1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/15/world/roots-of-terror-a-special-report-alms-and-
arms-tactics-in-a-holy-war.html (―[Hamas] has strong support from Islamic movements in neighboring 
countries, including . . . financial backing from Iran.‖); Michael Slackman, Iran Gives Hamas 
Enthusiastic Support, But Discreetly, Just in Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, at A10, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/world/middleeast/13iran.html. 
 51. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 274–79. The compensatory damages included ―pain and 
suffering, loss of prospective income, medical expenses, and solatium.‖ Id. at 272. With respect to 
punitive damages, the court applied a four-factor test, noting that courts in previous cases ―used a 
multiple of three times Iran‘s annual expenditure on terrorism and . . . have generally awarded $300 
million in punitive damages per terrorist incident,‖ and concluded that punitive damages were 
available ―against all of the defendants except Iran. . . .‖ Id. at 278 (citations omitted).  
 52. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1110 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (citing 
Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 275–77).  
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The Rubin plaintiffs soon discovered that ―[o]btaining the initial 
judgment against Iran was the easy part,‖ and that recovery would be far 
more difficult.
53
 After unsuccessful attempts to execute against various 
bank accounts
54
 and limited success executing against real estate,
55
 the 
plaintiffs developed a revised strategy which involved executing upon 
Iranian artifacts in U.S. museums.
56
 ―Once attached, the invaluable 
collections would be sold to the highest bidder at auction to pay the 
plaintiffs‘ judgment award.‖57  
Rather than sit by and watch while the artifacts potentially ―end up on 
coffee tables around the country,‖58 Iran eventually appeared in the 
enforcement proceedings.
59
 Perhaps spurred by new concern about its 
cultural property located in Western nations, Iran also has attempted to 
recover cultural property in the United Kingdom.
60
 Iran‘s efforts are 
supported by the coalition described above in addition to many Iranian-
Americans, most of whom presumably fled the current regime, and are 
petitioning U.S. President Barack Obama to intervene.
61
 National Iranian 
American Council (NIAC) Board of Directors member, Djamshid 
Foroughi, stated: ―As Iranian Americans, we simply cannot allow our 
heritage to be auctioned off.‖62 Most archeologists would agree.63 
 
 
 53. James Wawrzyniak, Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran: A Struggle for Control of Persian 
Antiquities in America, in YEARBOOK OF CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW 223, 226 (Sherry Hutt ed., 2008). 
 54. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 563 F. Supp. 2d 38, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2008) (rejecting 
attempt to attach bank accounts).  
 55. Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 376 F.3d 485, 489–90 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 56. E.g., Wawrzyniak, supra note 53, at 227.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Sharon Cohen, Whose Artifacts? Are They Iran‟s? Or Terrorist Victims‟?, CHI. DAILY 
HERALD, Feb. 22, 2009, at 16 (quoting Thomas Fortune Fay, lawyer for families affected by the 1983 
Beirut attack).  
 59. E.g., Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370, 2006 WL 2024247, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
July 14, 2006). Counsel for the Rubin plaintiffs, David Strachman, stated that ―he has no intention of 
trying to sell them commercially—something he says would be ‗absolutely inappropriate.‘‖ Cohen, 
supra note 58. 
 60. See infra Part III. 
 61. See Josh Gerstein, Judge Gives Terror Victims a Victory over Iran, N.Y. SUN, May 28, 2008, 
at 6, available at http://www.nysun.com/foreign/judge-gives-terror-victims-a-victory-over-iran/78754/ 
(―An Iranian-American attorney who led a petition drive [to submit a statement to President Barack 
Obama] opposing the seizure of the artifacts by the terror victims and their heirs, Jamshid Irani of 
Manhattan‖ was quoted as stating: ―These are belonging to the Iranian nation, not necessarily the 
Iranian government[.]‖). A European association of scholars specializing in Iranian studies, Societas 
Iranologica Europea, also has collected hundreds of signatures worldwide on a petition submitted to 
President Obama. Cohen, supra note 58.  
 62. Shadee Malaklou, NIAC Enlists Major Law Firm to Protect Persian Tablets, NAT‘L IRANIAN 
AM. COUNCIL (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2:page=NewsArticle&id=5640. 
NIAC was quoted as stating: ―Satisfying a court judgment out of assets that are part of a group of 
people‘s cultural heritage will inflict unnecessary and irreparable damage on them[.]‖ Id. 
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Congress is to blame for this particular aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks. Congress has passed politically popular laws purporting to aid 
victims of terrorism, but all it handed them, at best, was a prospective 
Pyrrhic victory.
64
 These laws effectively deputize plaintiffs‘ lawyers as 
―private secretar[ies] of state‖65 to file civil ―terrorism cases.‖66 
Inexcusably, Congress has encouraged terrorism victims to undergo 
ineffective financially and emotionally draining trials at which Iran would 
never even show up, much less pay any resulting judgment.
67
 And there 
are remarkably few assets in the United States or in other nations that 
potentially could be used to satisfy the judgment.
68
  
For example, Congress passed legislation in 1996, discussed below, 
named for Alisa Flatow, a Brandeis student who was killed in a 1995 
terrorist attack in Gaza.
69
 Alisa‘s father, Stephen Flatow, became a 
plaintiff in litigation against Iran.
70
 After the Flatow Amendment was 
passed in 1996, Mr. Flatow on national television stated: 
 
 
 63. E.g., Gerstenblith & Roussin, supra note 2. Much has been written about the uniqueness of 
cultural property. See Janet Blake, On Defining Cultural Heritage, 49 INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 61, 61 
(2000) (―Examples can be found from ancient times of concern for the protection of cultural artefacts 
and early legislation to protect monuments and works of art first appeared in Europe in the 15th 
century.‖); Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities: Reducing the 
Harm, Preserving the Past, 8 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 169 (2007) (analyzing scope of ―public interest‖ in 
archeological knowledge); John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CALIF. 
L. REV. 339, 344 (1989) (discussing uniqueness of cultural property); Joseph L. Sax, Heritage 
Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbé Grégoire and the Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 
1142 (1990) (―Public responsibility for the conservation of artifacts of historic or aesthetic value is 
now acknowledged everywhere.‖); Daniel Shapiro, Repatriation: A Modest Proposal, 31 N.Y.U. J. 
INT‘L L. & POL. 95 (1998). 
 64. Judge Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, stated that ―Flatow‘s original judgment against Iran has come to epitomize the phrase 
‗Pyrrhic victory.‘‖ Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 27 (D.D.C. 1999). The term 
―Pyrrhic victory‖ means a victory achieved at far too great a cost to the purported victor. See, e.g., The 
Phrase Finder, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/297150.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). It alludes 
to the victory of King Pyrrhus of Epirus over the Romans in 279 B.C. at the battle of Asculum in 
Apulia, achieved with great losses to King Pyrrhus‘ elite forces. Id.  
 65. Roger Parloff, Deep Freezing Terror‟s Assets, 24 AM. LAW. 122, 122 (2002).  
 66. E.g., Strauss, supra note 6, at 308 (―A new type of lawsuit has emerged in the United States, 
in which victims of terrorism, individually or in groups, have pursed the perpetrators of terrorist acts 
and the organizations of nations who have enabled and funded them.‖). See generally Joseph W. 
Dellapenna, Civil Remedies for International Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 169 (1999) (discussing 
pre-amendment litigation). 
 67. Iran has made a point not to appear in ―terrorism litigation‖ in the United States. E.g., Hoye, 
supra note 7, at 129.  
 68. E.g., id. 
 69. E.g., Baletsa, supra note 7, at 1247.  
 70. E.g., id. at 1248. 
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[The law g]ave me a weapon. In other words, a—a sovereign 
country has the right to launch Tomahawk missiles at another 
country to protect its rights . . . . I don‘t have that kind of power. I 
don‘t have $60 million to launch those kinds of missiles. But now I 
have something that‘s purely American. I have—I have American 
jurisdiction over the people who sponsored the terrorist attack 
which killed Alisa.
71
  
Three years later, Mr. Flatow was devastated yet again after he ―won‖ 
the case but could not force Iran to pay even a dime.
72
 He tried to convey 
his pain: ―If I knew then what I know [now], after spending tens of 
thousands of dollars trying to get some measure of justice for Alisa, I 
don‘t think I would have ever started this lawsuit.‖73 
Although the plaintiffs‘ lawyers in terrorism cases certainly took their 
cases in good faith on contingency, Mr. Flatow (and presumably other 
victims) had to pay nonrefundable costs to launch his law suit and 
recovery efforts.
74
 Moreover, despite literature about the cathartic benefits 
of litigation to terrorism victims
75
 and positive international law 
development spurred by some types of human rights litigation,
76
 it is more 
likely that the Rubin and Peterson plaintiffs experienced emotional turmoil 
 
 
 71. Id. at 1248 n.1 (citing 60 Minutes: In Memory of Alisa (CBS television broadcast Oct. 4, 
1998)).  
 72. Blomquist, supra note 7, at 15.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. See generally 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 60 (2009) (describing basic litigation finance). 
Third-party litigation finance could dramatically change this calculation and perhaps even lead to 
better recoveries for plaintiffs via extra-legal settlements. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This 
Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2011), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1586053 (last visited Feb. 23, 2011); John R. Crook, 
United States and Libya Sign Agreement to Resolve Pan Am Flight 103 and Other Claims , 102 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 892 (2008) (describing extra-legal $1.2 billion settlement).  
 75. See, e.g., Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation As a 
Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305, 2324 (2004) (―A favorable judgment or verdict . . . 
offers a public and official acknowledgement of rights, the stigmatization of violations, a measure of 
accountability, and a symbolic break with the past.‖).  
 76. In regard to Alien Tort Claims Act claims, Professor Van Schaack observed: 
Although ostensibly tort disputes seeking retrospective relief, obtaining an executable 
judgment was often a secondary goal of this litigation. Indeed, most of the cases‘ damage 
awards were issued by default and/or are unenforceable—a ―teasing illusion like a munificent 
bequest in a pauper‘s will.‖ Nonetheless, the cases exposed the presence of alleged abusers 
within the United States, created an opportunity for norm enunciation, and achieved, at a 
minimum, a symbolic denunciation of abuses. . . . 
 Human rights advocates have generally cheered these strategies and results, although a 
few detractors have denounced this endeavor as nothing more than ideological theatre. 
Id. at 2313–14. 
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by pursuing a trial at which Iran was not even compelled to show up
77—
except for now to contest the still-uncertain auction of unrelated artifacts.
78
 
The victims are left with no closure,
79
 likely feeling maligned by those 
trying to block the sale,
80
 feeling like no one is hearing their call for 
―justice.‖81 As in other human rights litigation,  
Plaintiffs may resent the ―commodification‖ of their experience 
when forced to quantify in financial terms the harm caused by 
torture or the extrajudicial killing of loved ones. Similarly, the 
introduction of money damages may distort some of the symbolic 
value of these cases and splinter a sense of solidarity among 
plaintiffs by creating competition for awards among different 
victims and subclasses and by raising concerns about distributive 
justice. Finally, a money damage award without any prospect of 
enforcement or prospective change may ultimately not satisfy 
retributive impulses and may actually undermine victims‘ faith in 
real justice or reform . . .
82
 
What is true regarding Alien Tort Claims Act litigation seems to be 
true regarding anti-terrorism litigation against Iran: ―[I]t may be a stretch 
to postulate that, at this point in time, the existence of the [legislation] or 
the potential to be sued in the United States exerts any sort of generalized 
deterrent function . . .‖83 Perhaps it is best to leave the war on terror and 
 
 
 77. E.g., Jerseyan Seeks Top-Level Aid in Iran Suit, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 18, 
1998, at 6 (quoting unnamed source from Tehran who stated that the Islamic Republic in Iran did not 
appear in the Flatow litigation and viewed the ultimate damage award as ―politically motivated‖ and 
―totally lacking objectivity and credibility‖). 
 78. See infra Part II. 
 79. E.g., Baletsa, supra note 7, at 1251. See generally Yael Danieli et al., The Psychosocial 
Aftermath of Terrorism, in UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM: PSYCHOSOCIAL ROOTS, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND INTERVENTIONS 223 (Fathali M. Moghaddam & Anthony J. Marsella eds., 2004); Enrico L. 
Quarantelli, An Assessment of Conflicting Views of Mental Health: The Consequences of Traumatic 
Events, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE: THE STUDY AND TREATMENT OF PTSD 191 (C.R. Figley ed., 
1985); Ginny Sprang, The Psychological Impact of Isolated Acts of Terrorism, in TERRORISTS, 
VICTIMS AND SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON TERRORISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 133 
(Andrew Silke ed., 2003).  
 80. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 81. E.g., Dave Newbart, „They Can Give Us Justice‟: Families of Marines Killed in Lebanon 
Join Suit Seeking Iran Funds, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 30, 2008, at 10 (quoting Luddie Belmer, mother 
of Alvin Belmer, who died in the 1983 bombing: ―‗They can give us justice by paying the money,‘ she 
said. Asked about the other victims, she said: ‗Pay them, too. Everybody [should] get justice.‘‖).  
 82. Van Schaack, supra note 75, at 2322–23.  
 83. See id. at 2332. See also, e.g., Jennifer Elise Plaster, Note, Cold Comfort and a Paper Tiger: 
The (Un)Availability of Tort Compensation for Victims of International Terrorism, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
533, 550–51 (2004) (stating that Congress‘ goals in passing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of deterring funding of terrorism have not been met).  
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trying to influence Iran and other nations in the Middle East to the 
executive branch.
84
 The attempts to force a sale of the artifacts are a 
distraction that gives further ammunition to the Iranian regime criticizing 
U.S. culture, values, and politics.
85
 
III. RUBIN V. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN—THE ENFORCEMENT STAGE 
Currently, the crux of the collection efforts by the ―victorious‖ Rubin 
plaintiffs involves ancient Iranian artifacts housed in some of the most 
esteemed museum collections in the country. The Oriental Institute‘s 
descriptions of some of the artifacts at issue reveal their archaeological 
significance: 
 
 
 84. Cf., e.g., Jeewon Kim, Note, Making State Sponsors of Terrorism Pay: A Separation of 
Powers Discourse Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 513 (2004) 
(discussing separation of powers problems posed by the Flatow amendment to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act). Analogous to criticism of civil anti-terrorism litigation generally, Andrew C. 
McCarthy, former lead prosecutor in the terrorism trials in the Southern District of New York has 
come to criticize the use of criminal trials in U.S. courts instead of military tribunals. Benjamin 
Weiser, Top Terror Prosecutor Is a Critic of Civilian Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/nyregion/20prosecutor.html (―A war is a war . . . . A 
war is not a crime, and you don‘t bring your enemies to a courthouse.‖). For recent discussion of 
diplomatic issues concerning Iran‘s nuclear program and sanctions, see, for example, Alan Cowell & 
Thom Shanker, Iran‟s Enrichment Plans Start New Calls for Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at 
A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/world/middleeast/09iran.html. But see Beth Van 
Schaack, Finding the Tort of Terrorism in International Law, 28 REV. LITIG. 381, 474 (2008): 
Civil litigation involving claims of international terrorism has the potential to play a part in a 
comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy, especially where military strikes or governmental 
sanctions may be considered too blunt a response, are politically unpalatable, or lack 
multilateral support. In particular, by harnessing the motivation, investigative capabilities, and 
resources of private attorneys general and the robust U.S. tort system on behalf of those 
victims who have access to the U.S. legal system, civil suits can enhance the government‘s 
ability to bring targeted criminal suits, aid in the rehabilitation of victims, and promote the 
rule of law in the face of acts of terrorism.  
See also Kellie McGowan, Note, Following the Money Trail: Can American Lawyers Use American 
and International Discovery Procedures to Prove the Link between International Terrorist Acts and 
Financiers?, 18 TEMP. INT‘L & COMP. L.J. 175 (2004). 
 85. Tell the Department of Justice to Prevent Ancient Persian Artifacts from Being Sold, NAT‘L 
IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL (Nov. 21, 2006), reprinted in Tell the Department of Justice to Prevent Ancient 
Persian Artifacts from Being Sold!, UNITED IRANIAN FRONT FOR DEMOCRACY IN IRAN (Nov. 21, 
2006), http://unitediranianfrontblogspot.com/2006/11/tell-department-of-justice-to-prevent.html.  
As political tensions have risen between the United States and Iran, the case has begun to 
receive international headlines. Manouchehr Mottaki, the Foreign Minister of Iran[,] has 
threatened to cancel proposed negotiations with the US while Hamid Reza Asefi, the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman, has called on the US to show a quick and serious reaction to the 
case.  
Id.  
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(1) Seal impressions, generally made of stone, tracing the 
chronology of Persepolis, a magnificent palace complex built 
around 518–516 B.C.86  
(2) Artifacts evidencing cultures on the plain in southwestern Iran, 
pushing back the date of human occupation by at least one 
millennium . . .
87
 
(3) Hundreds of pieces of prehistoric pottery, metal objects, and 
seals and figurines along with photographs and related 
documentation . . .
88
 
(4) Carved chlorite jars, bowls and cups from the Jiroft region, the 
home of a sophisticated civilization dating back to the third 
millennium B.C.
89
 
In addition to the University of Chicago‘s Oriental Institute, the other 
institutions housing artifacts sought by the Rubin plaintiffs include the 
Field Museum of Natural History (―Field Museum‖), Harvard University, 
and the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston.
90
 Accordingly, the litigation 
involves two lawsuits, one in each of the two jurisdictions in which these 
institutions are located: the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, 
in Chicago, which is currently subject to an interlocutory appeal,
91
 and the 
District of Massachusetts, in Boston, which was just remanded by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on the grounds that 
more fact-finding was necessary before an interlocutory appeal could be 
heard.
92
 The plaintiffs also pursued objects at the University of 
Pennsylvania and the University of Michigan but later voluntarily 
 
 
 86. Persepolis and Ancient Iran: Introduction, ORIENTAL INST. OF THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO, 
http://oi.uchicago.edu/museum/collections/pa/persepolis/introduction.html (last updated Apr. 19, 
2007) [hereinafter Persepolis Introduction]; Oriental Institute Photographic Archives: Seals and Seal 
Impressions, ORIENTAL INST. OF THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO, http://oi.uchicago.edu/museum/collections/ 
pa/persepolis/seals.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2007). 
 87. Abbas Alizadeh, Excavations at Chogha Bonut: The Earliest Village in Susiak, Iran, 
ORIENTAL INST. OF THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO, http://oi.uchicago.edu/research/pubs/nn/spr97_alizadeh. 
html (revised July 30, 2007). 
 88. Wawrzyniak, supra note 53, at 229. 
 89. Gov‘t of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Barakat Galleries Ltd., [2007] EWHC (QB) 705,[1] 
(Eng.) (―[Iran] seeks an order for the delivery up of a number of carved jars, bowls and cups made out 
of chlorite . . . .‖) [hereinafter Barakat I]. See also Andrew Lawler, Iranian Dig Opens Window on 
New Civilization, 304 SCIENCE 1096 (2004). 
 90. Sills, supra note 2, at 238.  
 91. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 251 F.R.D. 561 (N.D. Ill. 2008), appeal docketed, No. 08-
2805 (7th Cir. July 21, 2008). 
 92. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 541 F. Supp. 2d 416 (D. Mass. 2008), appeal denied, No. 
08-8021 (1st Cir. Aug. 11, 2008). 
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dismissed enforcement actions regarding artifacts in the collections of 
these institutions.
93
  
Because of the multiple lawsuits, parties, and collections involved as 
well as the complexity of the underlying legal issues, it can be difficult to 
follow the history of the enforcement litigation. In short, as it currently 
stands, the litigation turns primarily on two issues. The first issue is 
whether the museum‘s use of the artifacts constitutes ―commercial 
activity‖ that renders Iran‘s sovereign immunity irrelevant under the FSIA. 
The second issue is whether the various artifacts are ―blocked assets‖ 
within the meaning of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). The 
arguments for and against ―blocked asset‖ status vary by museum and 
collection. Underlying both issues is the threshold question of whether 
Iran even has an ownership interest in the artifacts. The details of the 
litigation will be discussed further throughout the remainder of this 
Section, but the following table provides a graphical overview: 
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE EXECUTION LITIGATION 
  
N.D. Ill. (―Chicago‖) Litigation D. Mass. (―Boston‖) Litigation 
Oriental 
Institute 
Field Museum MFA Boston Harvard 
Collections 
Involved 
Persepolis; 
Chogha Mish 
Herzfeld 
(various 
items) 
(various 
items) 
Court‘s 
Position on 
Sovereign 
Immunity 
Only Iran Can Assert Sovereign 
Immunity (resulted in Iran‘s 
appearance) 
The Court Has the Power to 
Determine Sovereign Immunity 
Sua Sponte 
Museum‘s 
Position as to 
Ownership 
Iran Not Iran Not Iran Not Iran 
Argument 
Different TRIA ―Blocked 
Assets‖ Arguments for Each 
Collection; FSIA ―Commercial 
Activity‖ Via Agency 
FSIA ―Commercial Activities‖ 
Exception; TRIA ―Blocked 
Assets‖ Provision 
Status 
On Interlocutory Appeal after 
Extensive Discovery Disputes 
Remanded by 1st Circuit for 
Additional Discovery 
 
 
 93. Wawrzyniak, supra note 53, at 227; e.g., Plaintiffs-Judgment Creditor‘s Notice of 
Withdrawal of Trustee Process, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 2:05-x-71387-VAR (E.D. 
Mich. Nov. 17, 2005). They had also pursued a residential property used by the former Iranian crown 
prince in Lubbock, Texas and two Iranian bank accounts, but they only had limited success, recovering 
approximately $390,000 from the sale of the residence. Wawrzyniak, supra note 53, at 226. 
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A. The Collections Involved in the Enforcement Litigation 
In the Illinois case, the plaintiffs are seeking to attach two collections at 
the Oriental Institute, the Persepolis Fortification Texts (the ―Persepolis 
Collection‖) and the Chogha Mish Collection.94 The Persepolis Collection 
contains tablets and tablet fragments dating back to the rule of Darius I 
around 500 B.C.
95
 that were excavated approximately 400 miles south of 
the present city of Tehran.
96
 Darius I envisioned Persepolis ―as a show 
place and the seat of his vast Achaemenian Empire.‖97  
The Chogha Mish Collection includes a fairly small amount of clay 
seal impressions
98
 that were excavated in Iran‘s Khuzistan Province,99 
providing ―vital new information on cultural developments‖ in the area 
and covering ―the complete chronological span from the Neolithic up to 
the Proto-Literate period. . . .‖100 The Oriental Institute has consistently 
stated that Iran owns both the Persepolis and Chogha Mish Collections, in 
accordance with Iran‘s claims of ownership.101 The ownership issue is 
particularly relevant because, as discussed further below, if the plaintiffs 
can show that ownership of the collections is ―contested,‖ then the 
collections would be subject to attachment under the ―blocked assets‖ 
provision of the TRIA. If Iran has title to the objects, then they might be 
able to be attached under the ―commercial activities‖ exception of the 
FSIA.
102
 
The other artifacts at issue in the Illinois litigation include the Field 
Museum‘s Herzfeld Collection.103 This collection consists of 
 
 
 94. Id. at 227. 
 95. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1110 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 96. Persepolis Introduction, supra note 86. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Rubin, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. 
 99. The Chogha Mish Project, ORIENTAL INST. OF THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO, http://oi.uchicago. 
edu/research/projects/cho/ (last updated June 17, 2010). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 C 9370, 2007 WL 1169701, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
17, 2007). 
 102. Id. at *8; id. at *2 (―The dispute in this case centers around whether the Persian artifacts are 
immune or exempt from execution or attachment. Plaintiffs have presented two theories that Plaintiffs 
argue allow them to execute or attach against these artifacts. The first theory involves the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act (―TRIA‖), which provides that properties belonging to Iran that are in the United 
States are subject to attachment in satisfaction of a judgment debt if those properties are ‗blocked‘ 
within the meaning of the TRIA . . . . The second theory involves the FSIA, which provides that 
properties belonging to a foreign state are immune from attachment unless some exception applies.‖ 
(citations omitted)). 
 103. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370, 2007 WL 2219105, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 
26, 2007). Of note, the plaintiffs allege that the Oriental Institute also has some items from the 
Herzfeld Collection. Rubin, 2007 WL 1169701, at *2. 
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approximately one thousand pieces, including pieces of prehistoric 
pottery, metal objects (such as bronze weapons and implements), 
ornaments, seals, and figurines.
104
 These items were collected by Professor 
Ernst Herzfeld in the early half of the twentieth century while on 
archaeological digs of Persian sites in and around Iran.
105
 The Field 
Museum has stated that it purchased the Herzfeld Collection many years 
ago and that Iran does not claim ownership.
106
 
In the Massachusetts case, the plaintiffs sought artifacts housed at the 
Museum of Fine Arts and Harvard. They asserted generally that Iranian 
law safeguarding ancient artifacts vested ownership in Iran, thus voiding 
any purported transfer to the museums.
107
 These institutions claim that 
they do not hold any cultural materials that are the property of Iran.
108
 
The following sections provide a more detailed overview of the 
plaintiffs‘ arguments for attachment under the FSIA and TRIA. While the 
overarching theories under each act are essentially the same for all of the 
artifacts at issue, the sub-arguments vary substantially depending on the 
facts pertinent to each collection and the differing positions of the two 
courts on key issues in the litigation. 
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Argument 
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity has a long and storied 
history beyond the scope of this Article, but its modern restrictive theory 
relevant to the Rubin litigation has been codified in the FSIA.
109 
The FSIA 
sets forth the general proposition that a ―foreign state shall be immune 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the 
States. . . .‖110 However, it also provides a number of exceptions to foreign 
 
 
 104. Hilton, supra note 6, at 495–96.  
 105. Ron Grossman, Museums in Legal Bind as Terror Victims Sue, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 2006, at 
1.  
 106. Rubin, 2007 WL 1169701, at *7. 
 107. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 456 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 108. Id. at 235–36 (―From the commencement of this action, the . . . defendants have repeatedly 
and emphatically argued that none of the antiquities in their possession belong to the Republic of 
Iran.‖). 
 109. See Lauren Felder Redman, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Using a “Shield” Statute 
as a “Sword” for Obtaining Federal Jurisdiction in Art and Antiquities Cases, 31 FORD. INT‘L L.J. 
781 (2008) (questioning the appropriateness of using the FSIA in art and antiquities litigation); Kim, 
supra note 84 (providing general history of anti-terrorism amendments to the FSIA); Jennifer A. 
Gergen, Human Rights and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 36 VA. J. INT‘L L. 765 (1996) 
(making the case that the FSIA was not intended for human rights litigation). 
 110. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006). 
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sovereign immunity.
111
 The Rubin plaintiffs contend that one of these 
exceptions, the ―commercial activity‖ exception, enables them to attach 
the museums‘ artifacts.112 
1. FSIA Standing 
Initially, the litigation in both courts centered on a standing issue—
whether sovereign immunity under the FSIA, and thereby its commercial 
activity exception, was an affirmative defense personal to Iran. The 
plaintiffs argued that it was an affirmative defense personal to Iran and, 
therefore, only Iran itself could assert that the property in question is 
immune from attachment.
113
 The museums countered that ―the Court‘s 
subject matter jurisdiction over the property in issue require[d] the Court 
to apply [the commercial activity exception of the FSIA] regardless of 
who raise[d] the issue of foreign sovereign immunity.‖114 
Each of the two courts arrived at different conclusions regarding the 
standing issue. The Illinois court found that, ―as a matter of law, no party 
other than Iran may assert Iran‘s foreign sovereign immunity defenses 
under Sections 1609 and 1610 of the FSIA.‖115 This ruling forced Iran to 
appear in the litigation to try to protect the artifacts, which it later did.
116
 
The Illinois court continues to rule against Iran seemingly on all fronts—it 
even stayed Iran‘s motion for summary judgment and entered an order 
compelling Iran to respond to plaintiffs‘ discovery requests concerning all 
Iranian assets in the United States.
117
 In contrast, the Massachusetts court 
concluded that ―it is appropriate for the Court, of its own accord or at the 
behest of the [museums in possession of the alleged sovereign property], 
to determine whether the property in dispute is immune from execution 
. . . .‖118  
 
 
 111. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–1611 (2006); see also Dellapenna, supra note 66, at 242–70; U.S. Dept. 
of State, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/ 
judicial_693.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 112. Rubin, 2007 WL 1169701, at *8. 
 113. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 408 F. Supp. 2d 549, 553 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 114. Id.; see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 456 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(noting that the ―issue . . . could be raised properly by . . . [the museums] or even by the Court sua 
sponte‖).  
 115. Rubin, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
 116. Rubin, 2006 WL 2024247, at *1. 
 117. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370, 2008 WL 2502039 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 
2008). 
 118. Rubin, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 233. 
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The approach of the Illinois court seems to run counter to the generally 
cautious approach federal courts take with foreign sovereigns,
119
 but most 
of the potentially relevant published cases concern Erie federalism issues 
not present in this case.
120
 Lately, despite the caution generally required by 
the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine,
121
 U.S. courts have 
predominantly been broadening the reach of the FSIA.
122
 The museums 
based their argument on
123
 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
124
 in 
which the Supreme Court concluded that though ―‗sovereign immunity is 
an affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded,‘‖ a court must 
evaluate its jurisdiction under the FSIA ―even if the foreign state does not 
enter an appearance to assert an immunity defense. . . .‖125 However, the 
Illinois court concluded that Verlinden did not apply:  
[T]he district court‘s responsibility to evaluate immunity sua sponte 
is rooted not in the FSIA, but rather in 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). Under 
§ 1330(a), federal courts have jurisdiction over actions against 
foreign states only if ―the foreign state is not entitled to immunity 
either under sections 1605–07 of this title or under any applicable 
international agreement.‖ Thus, Verlinden is inapposite for two 
reasons. First, the obligation to evaluate immunity sua sponte is 
created by § 1330(a), not by the FSIA. Second, the immunity that 
must be evaluated under § 1330(a) is immunity afforded the foreign 
state itself under § 1604, not afforded its property under § 1609, the 
only immunity at issue in this case.
126
  
This attempt by the Illinois court to distinguish Verlinden is, at best, 
flawed. As the Supreme Court recently stated in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 
―We normally do not read statutory silence as implicitly modifying or 
 
 
 119. See, e.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (―[b]y whatever 
route a case arrives in federal court, it is the obligation of both district court and counsel to be alert to 
jurisdictional requirements.‖ (extensive citations omitted)). 
 120. See generally id. 
 121. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lippert, Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt May Force a 
Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 21 N.Y. INT‘L L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (stating that ―the 
standards for bringing suit under the FSIA are rigorous, and sovereign states retain much of their 
immunity.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 122. Cf., e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (holding that the FSIA applies 
in disputes concerning activities that pre-dated its passage in 1976, which codified the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity adopted by the United States in 1952). 
 123. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 436 F. Supp. 2d 938, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 124. 461 U.S. 480, 493–94 n.20 (1983). 
 125. Id. (citation omitted). 
 126. Rubin, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 942 (citations omitted). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
258 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:239 
 
 
 
 
limiting . . . jurisdiction that another statute specifically grants.‖127 The 
Illinois court has done the converse—reading silence in one statute to 
expand jurisdiction that another statute denies. This seems to be even more 
serious than what the Supreme Court prohibited in Hertz. In Rubin, the 
U.S. Department of Justice attempted to sway the court but to no avail.
128
 
The Illinois court appears to be entrenched in its interpretation of its 
jurisdictional limitations, which, therefore, will likely stand at least until 
the matter reaches a higher court. 
2. The FSIA “Commercial Activity” Exception 
The second FSIA issue involves section 1610, referred to commonly as 
the ―commercial activity exception,‖ which provides that ―property in the 
United States of a foreign state . . . shall not be immune from attachment 
in aid of execution, or from execution, . . . if . . . the property is or was 
used for . . . commercial activity . . . .‖129 Despite the Illinois court‘s rebuff 
as to the standing issue, the plaintiffs were able to keep their FSIA 
argument alive by asserting that the museums were acting as agents of 
Iran,
130
 which, as discussed further below, remains an open question 
important in both cases. Thus, whether the museums‘ use of the artifacts 
constituted commercial activity under the FSIA remained an issue in both 
cases despite the different conclusions reached by the courts on the 
standing issue. 
In short, the plaintiffs argued that the museums‘ study and publication 
of the various collections amounted to commercial activity, thereby 
triggering jurisdiction under the exception.
131
 They further argued that the 
―commercial activity‖ exception includes activity by any party and not just 
the foreign state.
132
 The museums countered that their efforts were of an 
academic quality and ―could not be construed as a commercial 
endeavor.‖133  
 
 
 127. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660–61 
(1996); Ex parte Yerger, 85 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 104–05 (1869)).  
 128. Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 
03 CV 9370 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2004); Second Statement of Interest of the United States, Rubin v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2006); Third Statement of Interest of the 
United States, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2007). 
 129. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2006). For an analysis of the commercial activity exception in the context 
of the Rubin litigation, see Hilton, supra note 6. 
 130. Rubin, 2007 WL 1169701, at *8. 
 131. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 132. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 456 F. Supp. 2d 228, 233 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 133. Sills, supra note 2, at 246. 
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In contrast to their disagreement on the standing issue, the two courts 
reached the same conclusion as to the commercial activity exception, 
finding that it only applies if the foreign sovereign itself engages in the 
commercial activity.
134
 As the Fifth Circuit concluded ―‗[w]hat matters . . . 
is how the foreign state uses the property, not how private parties may 
have used the property in the past.‘‖135 Thus, the plaintiffs have not yet 
overcome the FSIA‘s presumption of immunity in either suit. However, 
the still open question of agency that kept the FSIA argument alive in the 
Illinois litigation has also kept the FSIA issue alive, this time in both 
cases. The heart of the issue is whether Iran has acted through the 
museums in regard to the care, study and conservation of the objects via 
an agency relationship.
136
  
Despite the courts‘ conclusions as to the commercial activity exception, 
recent congressional amendments to the FSIA may allow the plaintiffs to 
force a sale of the artifacts. On January 28, 2008, President Bush signed 
into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.
137
 
The legislation creates a new ―terrorism exception to immunity‖ in the 
FSIA, section 1605A, and amends section 1610, the ―commercial activity‖ 
exception.
138
 Of note, the new law is retroactive.
139
 In other words, it 
allows a plaintiff who obtained a judgment under the old law to obtain a 
new enforceable judgment under the new version of the law.  
First, section 1605A allows a terrorism victim to sue a foreign state for 
compensatory and punitive damages for materially supporting an act of 
terrorism. Specifically, it states the following: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts 
of the United States or of the States . . . in which money damages 
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that 
was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft 
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or 
resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support 
 
 
 134. Rubin, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 234. See also Rubin, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (stating that the 
commercial activity exception ―requires that the foreign sovereign‘s property was used by the foreign 
sovereign in the United States for commercial purposes‖ (citations omitted)). 
 135. Id. at 1113 (citing Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 257 n.5 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(emphasis in original)). 
 136. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370, 2007 WL 2219105 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 
2007) (discussing at length the potential for an agency relationship to affect the FSIA exception). 
 137. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3 
(2008). 
 138. Ronald J. Bettauer, Claims of Victims of Terrorism Against Foreign State in U.S. Courts, 102 
AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 101, 104 (2008). 
 139. Id. 
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or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such 
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, 
employment or agency.
140
 
Second, once a party files under section 1605A, a lien of lis pendens
141
 
is automatically created for ―any real property or tangible personal 
property that is . . . subject to attachment in aid of execution, or execution, 
under section 1610.‖142  
Finally, under amended section 1610, there is an express lack of 
limitation as to the type of property against which a judgment issued 
pursuant to section 1605A may be executed.
143
 It provides: 
Subject to paragraph (3), the property of a foreign state against 
which a judgment is entered under section 1605A, and the property 
of an agency or instrumentality of such a state . . . is subject to 
attachment in aid of execution, and execution, . . . regardless of— 
 (A) the level of economic control over the property by the 
government of the foreign state; 
 (B) whether the profits of the property go to that government;  
 (C) the degree to which officials of that government manage the 
property or otherwise control its daily affairs; 
 (D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in interest of 
the property . . . .
144
 
Thus, as stated by Laina Lopez (formerly Wilk), one of the attorneys 
for Iran, in an article about the litigation that she wrote in her individual 
capacity, a foreign state‘s property is subject to attachment regardless of 
whether the foreign sovereign is engaging in the ―commercial activity.‖145 
In response to amended section 1610 and the addition of section 1605A, 
the Rubin plaintiffs filed a motion on March 28, 2008, in Washington, 
 
 
 140. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083(a), 
122 Stat. 338 (2008). 
 141. ―Lis pendens‖ refers to ―the jurisdiction, power, or control acquired by a court over property 
while a legal action is pending.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (8th ed. 2004). 
 142. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083(a), 
122 Stat. 3, 338–39 (2008).  
 143. Id. § 1083(b).  
 144. Id.  
 145. Laina Wilk, Latest Developments in Rubin v. Iran and the New FSIA Exception to Immunity, 
28 U.S.C. §1605A, 1 A.B.A. SEC. INT‘L LAW 9, 10 (2008). ―This section thus seems aimed directly at 
eliminating Iran‘s defense in the Rubin case that the Persepolis Collection has not been used for any 
commercial act in the United States.‖ Id. 
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D.C., to amend their initial judgment to expressly state that their 
judgments also issue pursuant to section 1605A, to allow them to make 
use of the amendments.
146
 
According to Ms. Lopez, again in her individual capacity and not in the 
context of her role in the litigation, a core issue in the litigation going 
forward will be whether section 1605A, at least as applied in the Rubin 
litigation, violates the Algiers Accords.
147
 The Statement of Interest of the 
United States of America filed by the Executive Branch
148
 in the Illinois 
case does an excellent job of explaining the significance of the Algiers 
Accords to the dispute. As relayed by the U.S. Attorney General‘s Office: 
On January 19, 1981, Iran and the United States resolved the 
hostage crisis with the signing of the Algiers Accords. Under the 
Algiers Accords, the United States agreed, inter alia, to ―restore the 
financial position of Iran, insofar as possible, to that which existed 
prior to November 14, 1979,‖ and further agreed ―to commit itself 
to ensure the mobility and free transfer of all Iranian assets within 
its jurisdiction.‖ 
 For the purposes of implementing the commitments made in this 
agreement, the President issued several Executive Orders directing 
the marshaling and transfer of the majority of once-blocked assets 
to Iran and to escrow accounts to facilitate the settlement of claims 
involving Iran under a claims settlement process provided for in the 
Algiers Accords. . . . 
 As a result of [these orders and an implementing regulation 
issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control], nearly all 
previously-blocked properties, including those at issue here, 
namely, the artifacts held by the University of Chicago‘s Oriental 
Institute, were no longer subject to blocking under the Iranian 
 
 
 146. Plaintiff‘s Motion Pursuant to § 1083(c)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act—
2008, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 563 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2008) (No. 01-
1655(RMU)). 
 147. Wilk, supra note 145, at 10 (―Such a lien, to the extent it covers Iranian assets pending before 
the [Iran-United States Claims] Tribunal, violates the Algiers Accords.‖). 
 148. ―28 U.S.C. § 517 authorizes the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United 
States in any proceeding in which the United States is not a party. The submission of a Statement of 
Interest does not constitute an intervention in this action but is the equivalent of an amicus curiae 
brief.‖ Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 1 n.1, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, No. 03—CV-9370 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2004) (citing Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 305 F.3d 
1249, 1252–53 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).  
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Assets Control Regulations, but instead could be transferred at any 
time upon the request of the Government of Iran.
149
 
C. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (National Defense Act) Argument 
The Rubin plaintiffs also are attempting to attach the artifacts via 
section 201 of the TRIA,
150
 which is one of the misguided terrorism 
amendments to the FSIA that Congress passed in 2002 and which might 
very well violate the Algiers Accords.
151
 Like the Algiers Accords, the 
TRIA addresses the mechanics surrounding ―blocked assets,‖ providing as 
follows: 
[I]n every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a 
terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism, or for 
which a terrorist party is not immune under section 1605(a)(7) of 
title 28, United States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party 
(including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of 
that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid 
of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any 
compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been 
adjudged liable.
152
 
The TRIA defines ―blocked assets‖ as ―any asset seized or frozen by 
the United States under . . . sections 202 and 203 of the International 
Emergency Economics Powers Act . . .‖153 In response to the hostage 
emergency at the U.S. embassy in Iran,
154
 President Carter issued 
Executive Order 12,170 on November 14, 1979, blocking all Iranian assets 
in the United States.
155
 After the release of the hostages and per the 
Algiers Accords,
156
 President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12,281 
 
 
 149. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 9, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
No. 03 CV 9370 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2004) (―United States persons who engage in certain transactions 
related to Iranian properties located in the United States, however, remain subject to the Iranian 
Transactions Regulations, which implement a number of Executive Orders which were promulgated 
years after the signing of the Algiers Accords and the lifting of most of the blocking prohibitions.‖ 
(internal citations omitted)). In other words, trade restrictions, which are instituted by the President 
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, are not synonymous with blocking of 
assets. Id. at 9–10.  
 150. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 456 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 151. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 2322 (2002). 
 152. Id. at 2337. 
 153. Id. § 201(d)(2), 116 Stat. at 2338. 
 154. E.g., Sills, supra note 2, at 248. 
 155. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979)). 
 156. U.S. Department of State, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, http://www.state.gov/s/l/3199.htm (last 
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on January 19, 1981, effectively unblocking the assets.
157
 Related Treasury 
Department regulations defined the unblocked assets as ―all uncontested 
and non-contingent liabilities and property interests of the Government of 
Iran.‖158 A property is ―contested‖ and remains ―blocked‖ if the property 
holder ―believes, based on the bona fide written opinion of an attorney, 
that Iran ‗does not have title or has only partial title to the asset.‘‖159 
The Rubin plaintiffs argue that ownership of the Chogha Mish and 
Herzfeld Collections is ―contested,‖ signifying that they were not 
unblocked by Executive Order No. 12,281 (and thus still are blocked), and 
―that all are subject to execution to satisfy [p]laintiffs‘ judgment debt.‖160 
The museums counter that the Herzfeld Collection never was ―blocked‖ 
because it was not owned by Iran as of November 14, 1979, and, thus, that 
it was either not covered by President Carter‘s Executive Order 12,170161 
or was effectively ―unblocked‖ by the subsequent Executive Order.162 
The courts have not reached decisions as to ownership of the artifacts, 
which will determine their eligibility to satisfy the judgment. The Illinois 
court has ruled that plaintiffs are entitled to further discovery regarding the 
Chogha Mish and Herzfeld Collections in order to advance their argument 
that they are ―blocked‖ assets.163 The Massachusetts court has found that 
property ownership is ―contested,‖ and, as such, the property remains 
―blocked.‖164 ―Thus, if the plaintiffs are able to establish that the 
antiquities are indeed the property of Iran, those assets will be subject to 
attachment and execution pursuant to § 201 of TRIA.‖165  
The irony is that Iran—and, for that matter, the museums—is in a 
better legal position if it is found not to own the artifacts because then the 
artifacts would not be subject to execution, and the museums would be 
 
 
visited Jan. 24, 2011); U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Iran (July 23, 2010), http://www. 
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 157. Gerstenblith & Roussin, supra note 2, at 626 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,281, 46 Fed. Reg. 
7923 (Jan. 19, 1981)). 
 158. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 C 9370, 2008 WL 192321, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 
2008) (citing 31 C.F.R. § 535.333(a)). 
 159. Id. (citing 31 C.F.R. § 535.333(c)). 
 160. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 C 9370, 2007 WL 1169701, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
17, 2007). The plaintiffs argued that the Persian materials meet the definition of blocked assets 
because they are contested as Iran owns the collections, yet the museums say they do. Id. 
 161. Id. However, the Oriental Institute has maintained that Iran owns both the Persepolis and 
Chogha Mish Collections; therefore, title is not contested. Id. at *4–6. 
 162. Wawrzyniak, supra note 53, at 235. 
 163. Rubin, 2007 WL 1169701, at *5–7. 
 164. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 456 F. Supp. 2d 228, 235–36 (D. Mass. 2006) (―From the 
commencement of this action, the trustee process defendants have repeatedly and emphatically argued 
that none of the antiquities in their possession belong to the Republic of Iran.‖). 
 165. Id. at 236. 
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free to make a gift of them back to Iran after their studies are completed. 
The courts have not undertaken yet the factual determination as to who 
owns the various antiquities in question. Ownership of the antiquities 
depends to a large degree on Iranian law and how it will be regarded by 
the U.S. courts.  
There are many national and international legal frameworks aimed at 
restricting trade in ancient artifacts; some are broad in their stated goals, 
whereas others are quite specific and narrowly tailored to apply only to 
certain categories of artifacts from particular locations.
166
 These schemes 
include ―vesting statutes‖ and import and export controls among others.167 
Such statutes vest ownership in the state of all materials found after the 
effective date of the legislation.
168
 The Rubin plaintiffs have argued that 
ownership rests in Iran because of a vesting statute giving the state 
ownership of ―artifacts excavated in Iran by operation of Iranian law.‖169  
Two additional means for protecting cultural property are export 
controls and import controls. Export controls take ―the form of prohibition 
or licensing requirements.‖170 ―Some countries simply prohibit the export 
of all or some categories of art treasures . . . [while others] require that a 
 
 
 166. See generally Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal 
Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 388 (1995) (providing overview of cultural property customs 
restrictions). The following articles are useful to understanding the basic arguments concerning the 
best way to regulate the antiquities trade, with some in the field calling for the outright elimination of 
the market: Paul M. Bator, The International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 306 (1982) 
(landmark work providing that ―Art is a good ambassador.‖); Gerstenblith, supra note 63 (analyzing 
scope of ―public interest‖ in archeological knowledge); Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting 
the “Cultural” and “Property” Aspects of Cultural Property under International Law, 16 FORDHAM 
INT‘L L.J. 1033 (1992) (promoting a ―best interest of the object‖ standard); John H. Merryman, Two 
Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT‘L L. 831 (1986) (seminal work 
dichotomizing cultural nationalism/internationalism). See also Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest 
in the Restitution of Cultural Objects, 16 CONN. J. INT‘L L. 197 (2001); John H. Merryman, Cultural 
Property Internationalism, 12 INT‘L J. CULT. PROP. 11, 18–19 (2005); John H. Merryman, The Free 
International Movement of Cultural Property, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 1 (1998); John H. 
Merryman, The Nation and the Object, 3 INT‘L J. CULT. PROP. 61, 70 (1994). For a general history 
about the problem of plundered antiquities and the international trade in them, see, KARL E. MEYER, 
THE PLUNDERED PAST (1973).  
 167. See generally, e.g., Borodkin, supra note 166, at 388. 
 168. Id. at 392 (―As of 1984, state claims to undiscovered archaeological artifacts could be found 
in countries of every region and economic and political stratum.‖). 
 169. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-CV-9370, 2007 WL 2219105, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 
26, 2007). 
 170. Borodkin, supra note 166, at 391 (―As of 1989, at least 141 countries had some form of 
legislation regulating the export of antiquities.‖). The licensing requirement is found in countries such 
as Great Britain, France, Austria, Canada, and Australia. For example, Great Britain‘s Board of Trade 
reviews export applications. If the property meets the ―criteria of cultural significance,‖ the object 
must remain in Great Britain for six months so that a ―domestic purchaser may make a reasonable 
offer to the buy the object.‖ Id. at 392. 
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license be obtained before some or all works of art are exported.‖171 
Import restrictions may prohibit a cultural object‘s entry ―if it is stolen 
from another country,‖ if its export has not been properly licensed by the 
other country, or if the import nation‘s import regulations specifically 
prohibit importation of the object in question.
172
 Generally, however, 
nations do not recognize other nations‘ ownership of an artifact merely 
because it was exported from the source nation in violation of an export 
restriction or criminal law.
173
 Title in the object must have resided in the 
source nation.
174
 
In addition, the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property (―UNESCO Convention‖) is an important 
international effort to ―restrict the antiquities trade.‖175 The UNESCO 
Convention allows nations to enter into agreements in order to prevent the 
―illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property,‖ 
recognizing that ―international co-operation constitutes one of the most 
efficient means of protecting each country‘s cultural property . . .‖176 It 
calls for state parties to prohibit the import of stolen property and, in 
certain situations, to participate in a ―concerted international effort . . . 
including the control of exports and imports and international commerce 
in the specific materials concerned.‖177  
 
 
 171. Bator, supra note 166, at 286. 
 172. Id. at 327. 
 173. See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1977) (―The general rule 
today in the United States, and I think in almost all other art-importing countries, is that it is not a 
violation of law to import simply because an item has been illegally exported from another country.‖). 
 174. E.g., id. 
 175. Borodkin, supra note 166, at 388. 
 176. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 2, Nov. 14, 1970, 96 Stat. 2354, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 
available at http://www.un-documents.net/cppiiecp.htm [hereinafter UNESCO]. 
 177. Id. art. 9. ―The States Parties to this Convention undertake . . . [t]o take the necessary 
measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent museums and similar institutions within their 
territories from acquiring cultural property originating in another State Party which has been illegally 
exported . . . [and] at the request of the State Party of origin, to take appropriate steps to recover and 
return any such cultural property . . . .‖ Id. art. 7.  
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage of 
archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon other States Parties who are affected. 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a 
concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, 
including the control of exports and imports and international commerce in the specific 
materials concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned shall take provisional measures 
to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting 
State.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
266 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:239 
 
 
 
 
The United States signed the UNESCO Convention in 1970, but 
Congress did not enact its implementing legislation, the Convention on 
Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA), until 1983, and even then, 
the CPIA implemented only two provisions of the UNESCO treaty.
178
 The 
CPIA creates presidential authority to ―impose import restrictions[,] but 
only in certain circumstances and only after considering the views of 
concerned interest groups.‖179 Furthermore, import restrictions are 
imposed only for certain ―archaeological and ethnological material on a 
country-by-country basis.‖180 In conclusion, the United States is able to 
establish import restrictions after determining the requesting country‘s 
cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage and after determining that 
the country has taken measures to protect its own cultural heritage, among 
other things.
181
 
No U.S. import restriction applies to Iranian artifacts. Thus, whether 
the artifacts will be returned turns, in part, on whether Iranian law vests 
ownership of the Persian antiquities in Iran as the plaintiffs have 
suggested. This will be explored in Part III below. A preliminary matter, 
however, is laying out the types of foreign patrimony laws the United 
States recognizes. If a source nation‘s patrimony law is such that would be 
recognized in the United States, then property taken in violation of that 
law is considered converted property subject to civil or criminal 
restitution.
182
  
The leading U.S. case, United States v. McClain, which involved 
Mexican artifacts, held that ―declaration of national ownership is 
necessary before illegal exportation of an article can be considered theft, 
 
 
Id. art. 9. See generally Ann Guthrie Hingston, U.S. Implementation of the UNESCO Cultural 
Property Convention, in THE ETHICS OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY 129, 130 (Phyllis Mauch 
Messenger ed., 1989) (―Article 7(b) calls for each state party to take measures to prohibit the import of 
inventoried cultural property that has been stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public 
monument or similar institution located in a state party to the Convention. Article 9 provides that a 
state party whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological 
materials may call upon other state parties that are affected.‖). 
 178. See, e.g., Hingston, supra note 177, at 131. The United States has implemented only articles 
7 and 9. S. REP. NO. 97-564, at 2 (1982), available at http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/ 
index/pdfs/97-564.pdf. 
 179. Hingston, supra note 177, at 131–32. 
 180. Id. at 132. 
 181. Id. (citing Section 303 of the CPIA). For example, in 1987 the United States implemented 
import restrictions in response to the Republic of El Salvador‘s request under UNESCO‘s article 9. Id. 
at 143. The request focused on ―Pre-hispanic archaeological material‖ from the Cara Sucia region and 
reported that the ―intensive looting [is] destroying its archaeological heritage in this region . . . .‖ Id. at 
135. The report also cited the efforts the country had taken to protect its cultural heritage and to 
prevent looting in this region. Id. at 137. 
 182. E.g., id. 
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and the exported article considered ‗stolen‘. . .‖183 The Fifth Circuit 
closely examined pertinent Mexican law and concluded that it vested 
ownership in Mexico as to all antiquities found within its soil as of 
1972.
184
 The McClain case established that a nation seeking to establish 
title recognizable in U.S. courts by means of the nation‘s own laws must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the object was taken out 
of the ground within the nation‘s borders (2) after the nation had enacted 
effective vesting law and (3) that title of all objects taken out of the ground 
clearly vests in that nation.
185
 If the U.S. government also brings criminal 
charges, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
possessors knew that what it was taking did not belong to them (known as 
the scienter requirement).
186
 Mere violation of foreign export restrictions is 
not enough to void title, but if it appears egregious it will help the 
government establish the scienter requirement.
187
 All of these 
requirements, in both the civil and criminal context, are referred to 
collectively as the McClain doctrine.
188
  
The Second Circuit adopted the McClain doctrine in United States v. 
Schultz, another criminal prosecution under the NSPA.
189
 Schultz asserted 
that the Egyptian antiquities in question could not have been ―stolen‖ 
because they were not owned by anyone.
190
 However, the government 
argued that the ―antiquities were owned by the Egyptian government 
pursuant to a patrimony law known as ‗Law 117‘ which declared all 
antiquities found in Egypt after 1983 to be the property of the Egyptian 
government.‖191 
After reviewing McClain and other case law, the Second Circuit 
concluded that the ―NSPA applies to property that is stolen from a foreign 
government, where that government asserts actual ownership of the 
property pursuant to a valid patrimony law.‖192 It found that Law 117 was 
not just an export restriction on antiquities,
193
 but that its provisions made 
―it clear that the Egyptian government claims ownership of all antiquities 
 
 
 183. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 184. Id. at 1000–01. 
 185. See generally id. 
 186. E.g., id. at 1001 n.30. 
 187. E.g., id. 
 188. E.g., Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Choice Between Civil and Criminal Remedies in Stolen 
Art Litigation, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1199, 1246 n.335 (2005).  
 189. See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 190. Id. at 396. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 416. 
 193. Id. at 401. 
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found in Egypt after 1983, and the government‘s active enforcement of its 
ownership rights confirms the intent of the Law.‖194 Finally, in dicta, the 
court stated it believed that, ―when necessary, our courts are capable of 
evaluating foreign patrimony laws to determine whether their language 
and enforcement indicate that they are intended to assert true ownership of 
certain property, or merely to restrict the export of that property.‖195  
The U.S. government has shown some willingness to assist foreign 
countries by seizing objects, which puts the burden of showing title onto 
the one from whom they are seized.
196
 This offers a significant advantage 
to source countries, as they have had significant difficulty satisfying the 
McClain doctrine standards in civil litigation filed against owners, in part 
because ancient cultures crossed many modern-day boundaries.
197
 
The McClain case also indicates that the source country must enforce 
its law with regularity for it to be enforced in the United States, but that 
point is not certain.
198
 Few countries consistently enforce their export 
restrictions and ownership laws in regard to antiquities.
199
 Those 
particularly known for doing so include Mexico,
200
 Egypt,
201
 Cyprus,
202
 
and Turkey.
203
 Iran can now be added to this list. Over time, additional 
source nations have firmed up vesting laws, or ―in-the-ground laws,‖ in 
the hopes that clearly vesting title in the source nation of all antiquities 
still located within the earth would lead to recognition of the source 
nation‘s ownership of the object, and eventual return of the object from the 
United States—the largest antiquities market in the world.204  
 
 
 194. Id. at 402. 
 195. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 410. 
 196. E.g., Kreder, supra note 188, at 1232. 
 197. E.g., Kreder, supra note 188, at 1233–34. 
 198. Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places: Unprovenanced Antiquities and the 
National Stolen Property Act, 40 N.M. L. REV. 123 (2010).  
 199. E.g., id. 
 200. For example, McClain was initiated by a request from the Republic of Mexico. McClain, 545 
F.2d 988. 
 201. United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003), was an action to recover Egyptian 
antiquities. Egypt‘s Secretary General of the Supreme Council of Antiquities, Zahi Hawass, is 
notoriously aggressive in seeking the return of Egyptian antiquities. E.g., Phil Bolton, Egypt 
Archaeologist Has a Vigilant Eye for Stolen Antiquities, GLOBALATLANTA.COM (Mar. 28, 2009), http: 
//www.globalatlanta.com/article/17239. 
 202. E.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 
1990).  
 203. E.g., Republic of Turkey v. Metro. Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 204. The development of law in the Republic of Colombia provides a clear example. After signing 
its first bilateral agreement with the United States in 2006, Colombia amended its cultural property 
laws in such a manner to comply with the McClain doctrine in 2008. See Country Summary for 
Colombia, INT‘L FOUND. FOR ART RESEARCH, http://ifar.org/country_title.php?docid=1180064085 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2011).  
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At this point, the McClain doctrine has been followed (with some 
inconsistencies) in the Second,
205
 Fifth,
206
 Ninth,
207
 and Eleventh 
Circuits.
208
 Petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court were filed in both 
McClain and Schultz, but the Court did not grant the petitions and thus has 
not taken up the issue.
209
 Nonetheless, the norm remains that simply 
violating a source nation‘s export laws warrants neither criminal 
prosecution nor civil liability including seizure of an object of antiquity in 
the United States.
210
  
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the matter directly, 
it appears that the United States will continue to recognize foreign 
patrimony statutes.
211
 In Rubin, the plaintiffs allege that all artifacts in the 
Herzfeld Collection belong to Iran by virtue of Iranian law. The positions 
of the defendants with respect to ownership of the various artifacts in 
question can be summarized as follows:  
1. The Museum of Fine Arts and Harvard University have stated 
the Persian materials in their collections are not the property of Iran, 
which Iran has not attempted to refute.
212
  
2. The Oriental Institute maintains that Iran owns the Chogha Mish 
and Persepolis Collections.
213
  
3. The Field Museum has stated that Iran makes no claim of 
ownership as to the Herzfeld Collection.
214
 However, Iran‘s counsel, 
while cautious in noting that Iran has never claimed ownership of 
the Herzfeld Collection, would not ―affirmatively state that Iran did 
 
 
 205. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393. 
 206. McClain, 545 F.2d at 1000–01. 
 207. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974) (pre-dating McClain but 
nevertheless largely consistent and involving the same smuggling ring).  
 208. McClain was decided before the Eleventh Circuit was split off from the Fifth Circuit on 
October 1, 1981. History of the Court of Appeals, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, http:// 
www.ca11.uscourts.gov/about/appealshistory.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2011). 
 209. Schultz v. United States, 540 U.S. 1106 (2004); McClain v. United States, 444 U.S. 918 
(1979). 
 210. Bator, supra note 166, at 287. 
 211. E.g., Kreder, supra note 188, at 1232. 
 212. Id. at 1230. 
 213. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 C 9370, 2007 WL 1169701, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
17, 2007). However, the plaintiffs have argued that the Oriental Institute may believe that Iran has 
partial title; their discovery request for related information was granted. Id. at *10. They further argued 
that the Chogha Mish Collection might be ―contested‖ because it is before the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal. Id. at *6. 
 214. Id. at *7. 
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not own the Collection.‖215 Nonetheless, Iran‘s counsel has 
represented that Iran never will claim the Herzfeld Collection.
216
 
The next question is whether Iran‘s laws validly vest such ownership in 
cultural properties in the state. The issue has recently been litigated in 
British courts, where Iran has attempted to retrieve other cultural artifacts. 
III. ENGLISH CASES EVALUATING IRANIAN LAW 
Iran filed suit in London, a large art market, against a premiere 
antiquities gallery,
217
 in an attempt to stop the potential sale of historically 
significant antiquities from an archeological site within Iran.
218
 This 
litigation, Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Barakat Galleries 
Ltd., could impact the Rubin litigation. In fact, the Illinois court allowed 
plaintiffs‘ discovery requests for the Barakat pleadings from Iran.219 This 
litigation deals with the interpretation of Iran‘s national ownership laws 
and whether they confer property rights that England recognizes.
220
 It was 
heard first by England‘s High Court of Justice Queen‘s Bench Division 
and then was appealed to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division).  
In this litigation, Iran sought the return of a ―number of carved jars, 
bowls and cups made out of chlorite . . . from the Jiroft region of Iran.‖221 
The Jiroft region is thought to have been the origin of ―one of the earliest 
literate societies in the world,‖222 and the Jiroft objects are considered a 
major find.
223
 Iran contends that, under certain provisions of Iranian law 
 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. THE BARAKAT GALLERY, http://www.barakatgallery.com/store/Index.cfm?FuseAction= 
AboutUs&UserID=0 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (―The Gallery is a purveyor of museum quality 
ancient art specializing in Classical antiquities, Near Eastern, Biblical, Chinese, Pre-Columbian, 
Byzantine, Asian, African and Primitive arts.‖). 
 218. Gov‘t of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Barakat Galleries Ltd., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1374, 
[2009] Q.B. 22 (Eng.) [hereinafter Barakat II]; see also Islamic Republic of Iran v. Berend, [2007] 
EWHC (QB) 132 (declining to award antiquities to Iran under interpretation of French law). 
 219. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370, 2007 WL 2219105, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 
26, 2007) (observing that the magistrate judge granted discovery because of the ownership issue of 
whether ―Iran owns artifacts excavated in Iran by operation of Iranian law . . .‖). 
 220. Barakat II, [2007] EWCA 1374, [6]. 
 221. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [1]. Archaeologists, who had thought that a Bronze Age 
civilization ―flourished‖ in the region, are excited about the ―prospect of revealing Jiroft‘s secrets.‖ 
Andrew Lawler, Jiroft Discovery Stuns Archaeologists, 302 SCIENCE 973, 973–74 (2003). 
 222. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [1]. 
 223. Lawler, supra note 221 (quoting Holly Pittman, art historian at the University of 
Pennsylvania, as saying: ―This is another Bronze Age civilization comparable to the Indus and 
Mesopotamia, but smaller in scale and less complex. It will be extremely important‖). The finds 
include a ―massive stepped structure‖ that researchers believe may be a ziggurat (temple). If it is a 
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discussed below, it is the lawful owner of the objects in question.
224
 In the 
alternative, Iran claims conversion by the Barakat Gallery because, even if 
it is not the owner of the Jiroft objects per Iranian law, it had an 
―immediate right to possession of the antiquities‖ under such law.225 
The Barakat Gallery, with showrooms in London and Beverly Hills, is 
a ―purveyor of museum quality ancient art.‖226 Barakat admits that it 
possesses the cultural material in question, ―but disputes the entitlement of 
Iran to [its] return.‖227 It purports to have obtained good title to the objects 
through legitimate purchases in countries such as France, Germany, and 
Switzerland.
228
 ―In the alternative Barakat maintains that, even if . . . Iran 
has title to the antiquities by virtue of the laws of Iran, the present claim 
cannot succeed because Iran is seeking . . . to enforce . . . Iranian penal or 
public laws.‖229 As mentioned in Part II above, generally, a nation‘s penal 
or public laws, including export regulations, are not enforceable in other 
nations.
230
 
Both parties accepted that Iran did not give consent to the removal of 
the cultural materials.
231
 Furthermore, it was assumed that the objects 
came from the Jiroft region and that the excavation was ―unlicensed and 
therefore unlawful.‖232 Finally, for the purposes of trial, the court assumed 
that ―Iranian law is the applicable law for the acquisition/transfer of title to 
the antiquities.‖233 
A. Queen‟s Bench Division—Iranian Laws Did Not Vest Ownership 
The lower English court addressed two issues. First, whether Iran can 
show it has obtained title to the Jiroft objects ―as a matter of Iranian law 
 
 
ziggurat, some believe it could be one of the largest and earliest known with an estimated date of 2300 
B.C.E. Lawler, supra note 89. 
 224. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [6].  
 225. Id. [9]. Iran relies mainly on the Legal Bill of 1979, which requires an individual who 
discovers antiquities to deliver them ―as soon as possible‖ to the closest office of Culture and Higher 
Education. Id. [61]. Therefore, Iran argues, it is entitled to immediate right of possession. Id. Barakat 
counters that in order for such a claim to succeed, the claimant must have a proprietary right. Id. [62]. 
The court concluded that a proprietary right is required in order to establish conversion or wrongful 
interference, which, as discussed herein in Section a., Iran was unable to accomplish. Id. [71]. 
 226. THE BARAKAT GALLERY, supra note 217. 
 227. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [2]. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See generally William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 161 
(2002). 
 231. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [1]. 
 232. Id. [1], [5]. 
 233. Id. [5]. 
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and, if so, by what means.‖234 Second was, if Iran can show that it 
obtained title via Iranian law, ―whether this court should recognise and/or 
enforce that title.‖235 
Iran conceded that there is no one specific provision of Iranian law that 
vests ownership of antiquities in the state.
236
 Iran maintained that ―it is 
apparent from a consideration of a series of statutory provisions . . . that 
Iranian law has treated the state as the owner of articles, such as the 
antiquities, which form part of Iran‘s national heritage.‖237 In particular, 
Iran relied on the Civil Code, the National Heritage Protection Act of 
1930, 1930 Executive Regulations, the Legal Bill of 1979, the Constitution 
of 1979, and the Punishments Act of 1996.
238
 Each will be addressed in 
turn. 
The main civil laws of Iran were codified in 1928 in the Civil Code.
239
 
There are many provisions which are noted in the court‘s summary of 
Iranian law. This article addresses the most relevant.
240
 First is Article 26 
of Section 3 On Properties which have No Private Owner: 
Government properties which are capable of public service or 
utilisation, such as fortifications, fortresses, moats, military 
earthworks, arsenals, weapons stored, warships and also 
government furniture, mansions and buildings, government 
telegraphs, public museums and libraries, historical monuments and 
similar properties, and in brief, any movable or immovable 
properties which may be in the possession of the government of 
public expediency and national interest, may not privately be 
 
 
 234. Id. [4]. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. [15]. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. [20]–[58]. The court noted that, although Iran made no reliance on it, the ―appropriate 
starting point‖ is the Constitutional Movement when the ―king‘s domain became the Crown‘s, or 
government property. When the Iranian main laws were codified in the Civil Code of Iran . . . the 
internal ‗government properties‘ legally replaced the king‘s domain.‖ Id. [17]. However, this 
information was not part of Iran‘s case and as such, the court did not consider it. Id. [19]. 
 239. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [20]. 
 240. The court also summarized articles 30, 31, 32, 35, 36 in chapter 2 On Various Rights that 
People May Have in Properties; article 165 in chapter 4 On Found Articles and Lost Animals; articles 
173, 174, 175, 176 in chapter 5 On Treasure Trove; articles 308, 309, 317 in subsection 1 On 
Usurpation. Id. [20]. The court determined that chapter 2 demonstrates that ―Iranian law both 
recognises and respects private ownership which, unless the law otherwise provides, carries with it a 
right to absolute control on the part of the owner over his property.‖ Id. [41]. The court also stated that 
articles in chapters 4 and 5 ―lend some support to Barakat‘s assertion that the Civil Code provides for 
the finder of an article to become the owner;‖ however, it was not possible for the court ―to be 
categorical on this point. . . .‖ Id. [42]. 
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owned. The same applies to properties that have, in the public 
interest, been allocated to a province, county, region or town.
241
 
The court rejected the argument proffered by Iran‘s expert that the 
Jiroft material ―fall[s] within the category of ‗historical monuments and 
similar properties‘ which, according to Article 26, may not be privately 
owned.‖242 The court declined to extend the words ―and similar properties‖ 
to include ―movable antiquities,‖ but it did accept the evidence of 
Barakat‘s expert that ―movable antiquities are not ‗in use by the 
Government for the service of the public‘ within the meaning of Article 
26.‖243 The court further noted that article 26 refers to the properties 
therein as being in the ―possession‖ of the government rather than using 
words of ―ownership.‖244 
The National Heritage Protection Act of 1930 was passed in order to 
provide for an inventory of Iranian national heritage, including items 
―which possess historical, scientific or artistic respect and prestige.‖245 The 
Act provides for the registration of both immovable and movable 
properties.
246
 There are several relevant provisions that the court 
examined:
247
 
 Article 1—All works of art and movable and immovable 
creations which have been produced in Iran, as well as all 
historical sites, dating from before the end of the Zend dynasty, 
are, by virtue of Article 2 of the present law, considered as 
 
 
 241. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [20] (emphasis added). 
 242. Id. [40]. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. [21]. 
 246. Id. Articles 4 to 6 deal with immovable property. Article 7 and those following deal with 
movable property. Article 9 requires the owner of movable property registered on the List for National 
Heritage to notify the relevant governmental entity prior to selling it. Id. 
 247. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [43]–[44]. Iran also relied on articles 13, 16 and 17. Id. 
[46]. Article 17 requires individuals wanting to trade/export antiquities to obtain a license; items on the 
Inventory will be ―confiscated by the State if any attempt is made to export it without State 
authorization.‖ U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC, & CULTURAL ORG., THE PROTECTION OF MOVABLE 
CULTURAL PROPERTY, COLLECTION OF LEGISLATIVE TEXTS: IRAN (1988), at 3, available at http:// 
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0007/000785/078538eo.pdf [hereinafter UNESCO LEGISLATIVE TEXTS: 
IRAN]. Article 16 states that an individual violating article 10 or conducting excavations without State 
authorization shall be fined and the items confiscated. Id. Article 13 states that excavations, even on 
private land, may only be undertaken with State authorization. Id. The court commented that articles 
13, 16, and 17 are ―inconsistent with a pre-existing state ownership of antiquities.‖ Barakat I, [2007] 
EWHC (QB) 705, [46]. By these provisions, ownership vests in the State, but only in concert with a 
conviction in criminal court. Id. 
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national antiquities and are placed under the protection and 
control of the State. 
 Article 5—Private individuals who are owners . . . of property 
listed in the Inventory . . . retain their right of ownership . . . but 
may not oppose measures which the State considers that it has to 
take for the preservation of those antiquities. If work undertaken 
by the State entails expenditure, no reimbursement of that 
expenditure may be claimed from the owner nor shall the work 
in question . . . affect his right of ownership. 
 Article 10—Any person happening to discover any movable 
property which . . . could be considered as a national antiquity, 
even if that property is on his own land, must notify the Ministry 
of Education . . . as soon as possible. Should the relevant public 
authorities decide that the movable property in question ought to 
be listed in the Inventory . . . half of the property discovered, or 
of its value as determined by appraisal, shall be due to the 
finder. The State may, at its own discretion, decide whether to 
retain the other half or donate it to the finder. 
 Article 14—Items discovered during scientific or commercial 
excavations . . . belong exclusively to the State if the State has 
itself undertaken the excavations. If the excavations have been 
undertaken by a third party, the State may select and 
appropriate up to ten items of historical or artistic value and 
donate half of the remainder to the finder, keeping the other half 
itself. If there are not more than ten items in all and if the State 
keeps them all, the expenses incurred by the excavations are 
reimbursed to the person who provided the funds. Buildings and 
parts of buildings are not covered by the above provision 
regarding sharing and the State is entitled to appropriate them in 
toto.
248
 
The court emphasized that article 1 ―makes clear that the aim of the 
Act is to protect under State control . . . artefacts which may be considered 
to be part of the national heritage of Iran,‖ distinguishing ―state control‖ 
from ―state ownership.‖249 Article 5 permits individuals to retain 
ownership, and article 9 requires an owner to notify the government before 
 
 
 248. UNESCO LEGISLATIVE TEXTS: IRAN, supra note 247, at 1–3 (underlining in original; italics 
added). 
 249. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [43]. 
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he sells the artifact.
250
 Although article 9 references a state right to 
preemption, and article 10 requires state payment to the finder, article 14 
notes that the ―State may choose and take ownership.‖251 
The court accepted the testimony of Barakat‘s expert ―that the 1930 
Act primarily regulates the listing of the national heritage and makes 
provision for measures to be taken to protect and preserve items of the 
National Heritage, for example by restricting excavations and export.‖252 It 
concluded that the 1930 Act regulates, protects and preserves, and is not 
―concerned with property rights.‖253 
In 1932, the Executive Regulations of the National Heritage Protection 
Act of 1930 were approved by Iran‘s Council of Ministers.254 These 
regulations were designed to implement the 1930 Act.
255
 The court 
referred to various provisions, but found that just as the 1930 Act did not 
confer ownership, neither did the regulations.
256
  
Central to the decision was the Legal Bill of 1979 (―Legal Bill‖), 
entitled ―Legal Bill Regarding Prevention of Unauthorised Excavations 
and Diggings intended to obtain antiquities and historical relics which 
according to international criteria, have been made or have come into 
being one hundred or more years ago.‖257 It consists of one article: 
1. Considering the necessity of protection of relics belonging to 
Islamic and cultural heritage, and the need for protection and 
guarding these heritages from the point of view of sociology and 
scientific, cultural and historical research and considering the need 
for prevention of plundering these relics and their export abroad, 
which are prohibited by national and international rules, the 
following Single Article is approved: 
1. Undertaking any excavation and digging intended to obtain 
antiquities and historical relics is absolutely forbidden and the 
offender shall be sentenced to six months to three years correctional 
imprisonment and seizure . . . of the discovered items and 
excavation equipment in favour of the public treasury. If the 
 
 
 250. Id. [44]. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. [47]. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. [23]. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [48]. The court briefly discussed Articles 17, 18, 31, 36. 
Id. [48]–[50]. 
 257. Id. [26], [51]. 
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excavation takes place in historical places that have been registered 
in the National Heritage List, the offender shall be sentenced to the 
maximum punishment provided. 
2. Where the objects named in this [Act have been] discovered 
accidentally, the discoverer is duty bound to submit them to the 
nearest office of Culture and Higher Education as soon as possible. 
In this case, a committee consisting of the Religious Judge, local 
Public-Prosecutor and the director of the office of Culture and 
Higher Education, or their representatives, will be formed with a 
specialised expert attending and who will examine the case and 
decide as follows: 
A. Where the items are discovered in a private property, in the case 
of precious metals and jewels, they will be weighed and a sum equal 
to twice the market value of the raw material thereof will be paid to 
the discoverer. In the case of other objects, half of the estimated 
price will be paid to him.  
B. Where the items are discovered in non-private property, a sum 
equal to half of the discovery reward, provided for in Section A, 
will be paid to the discoverer[.] 
3. Antiquities means articles that according to international criteria 
have been made or produced 100, or more, years ago. In the case of 
objects whose antiquity is less than a hundred years, the discovered 
objects will belong to the discoverer after he has paid a fifth of their 
evaluated price to the public treasury. 
4. Persons who offer the discovered objects for sale or purchase in 
violation of the provisions of this Act will be sentenced [as] 
provided for in Section 1.
258
 
Iran‘s expert contended that the Legal Bill‘s purpose is ―to render 
unauthorised digging and excavating of antiquities ‗absolutely prohibited‘ 
and to penalise those who offer antiquities for sale or purchase,‖ reflecting 
―the fact that such antiquities belong to the state.‖259 However, Barakat‘s 
expert argued that the bill has the ―limited objective of preventing the 
plundering of relics‖ and is only a ―criminal statute.‖260 The view of 
Barakat‘s expert prevailed, and the Legal Bill was not construed to be a 
 
 
 258. Id. (emphasis added).  
 259. Id. [53]. 
 260. Id. 
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vesting statute.
261
 ―[T]he draftsman could so easily have provided for state 
ownership of all antiquities if such had been his intention.‖262 
Also in 1979, Iran adopted a new Constitution.
263
 The key provisions 
follow: 
 Article 45 [Public Wealth]—Public wealth and property, such as 
uncultivated or abandoned land, mineral deposits, seas, lakes, 
rivers and other public waterways, mountains, valleys, forests, 
marshlands, natural forests, unenclosed pastures, legacies 
without heirs, property of undetermined ownership, and public 
property recovered from usurpers, shall be at the disposal of the 
Islamic government for it to utilize in accordance with the public 
interest . . .  
 Article 83 [Property of National Heritage]—Government 
buildings and properties forming part of the national heritage 
cannot be transferred except with the approval of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly; that too, is not applicable in the case of 
irreplaceable treasures.
264
 
The court concluded that these constitutional provisions did not 
provide for any state ownership.
265
 It stated that even if ―antiquities‖ fell 
within the category of ―public wealth‖ in Article 45, designation that 
would not help Iran‘s argument because Article 45 ―refers only to 
possession by the Government.‖266 Furthermore, the court maintained that 
Article 83 does not indicate state ownership, but only requires Islamic 
Consultative Assembly approval prior to transfer of specified property.
267
 
The final pieces of the Iranian law puzzle were provisions of the Fifth 
Book of Islamic Punishment Law ratified in 1996.
268
 Iran relied upon the 
following three provisions:  
 
 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. The court noted that ownership is only affected after seizure upon criminal court 
conviction. Id. [54]. 
 263. Id. [27]. 
 264. QUANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], arts. 45, 83. The Barakat I court also referenced Article 47, [2007] EWHC 
(QB) 705, [27], which states that validly acquired private ownership is to be respected. THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN art. 47. 
 265. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [56]. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. [29]. See also Islamic Penal Code of Iran, MISSION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN IRAN (―MEHRIRAN‖), http://mehr.org/Islamic_Penal_Code_of_Iran.pdf (last visited Jan. 
26, 2011), which states that Ta‘azirat, Book Five of the Penal Code, was ratified on May 22, 1996. 
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Article 559—any person found guilty of stealing equipments and 
objects, as well as the materials and pieces of cultural-historical 
monuments from museums, exhibits, historical and religious places or any 
other places which are under the protection and control of the state; or 
trades in such objects or conceals them—knowing that they are stolen—
shall be obliged to return them and condemned to confinement of one to 
five years if not subject to punishment for theft (as ordained by Islamic 
religion) . . . . 
Article 561—any attempt to take historical-cultural items out of the 
country, even if it would not be actually exported, shall be considered as 
illegal export. The violator shall be condemned to restitute the items, 
imprisoned from one to three years, and fined as (sic) twice as the value of 
the items exported . . . . 
Article 562—any digging or excavation intended to obtain historical-
cultural properties is forbidden. The violator shall be condemned to 
undergo a confinement of six months to three years; the discovered objects 
shall be confiscated in the interests of the Iranian Cultural Heritage 
Organisation and the equipments of the excavation shall be confiscated by 
the state. 
Note 1. Whoever obtains the historical/cultural properties, that are the 
subject of this Article, by chance and does not take (the necessary) steps to 
deliver the same, according to the regulations of the State Cultural 
Heritage Organisation, will be sentenced to the seizure of the discovered 
(found) properties . . . .‖269 
The court rejected the idea that these criminal provisions vested 
ownership of antiquities in the State: articles 561 and 562 provide for 
confiscation as a consequence of criminal prosecution, but neither 
addresses the ownership issue.
270
  
In summary, after considering the provisions outlined in this section, 
the court concluded ―with some regret‖ that Iran had not met its burden in 
establishing its ownership of the Jiroft objects under Iranian laws.
271
 
Although Iran has ―gone to some lengths‖ to protect its natural heritage 
and prevent illegal looting and removal, ―the enactments relied on by Iran 
fall short . . . of establishing its legal ownership of the antiquities.‖272 
Furthermore, even consideration of the various legal schemes together is 
 
 
 269. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [29] (emphasis added). 
 270. Id. [58] (―These Articles say nothing of the position in regard to ownership prior to the 
seizure or confiscation.‖). 
 271. Id. [59]. 
 272. Id. 
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not enough to affect the ―vesting [of] ownership in the State . . . by default 
or as a matter of inference.‖273 
Because the court found that Iran did not meet the first issue by 
establishing ownership in the Jiroft objects under Iranian law, it was not 
required to address the second issue regarding justiciability—whether the 
court ―should recognise and/or enforce Iran‘s title to the antiquities.‖274 
However, it did briefly express its conclusions on this issue.  
As mentioned above, courts globally will generally refuse to enforce a 
foreign public law.
275
 English courts are no different, and they do not have 
the jurisdiction, directly or indirectly, to enforce a ―penal, revenue, or 
other public law of a foreign state.‖276 Barakat contended that Iran was 
seeking to enforce the penal or other public law of Iran.
277
 The court cited 
Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws in defining a penal law: 
A penal law is a law which punishes or prevents an offence. To 
come within this principle the law does not have to be part of the 
criminal code of the foreign country. Thus a law intended to protect 
the historic heritage of New Zealand by forfeiting historic articles 
illegally exported was held to be penal.‖278 
This definition references a prior Court of Appeal case, Attorney 
General of New Zealand v. Ortiz,
279
 that the Barakat I court relied upon.
280
 
The Ortiz court found that a New Zealand statute was penal because ―[i]t 
concerns a public right—the preservation of historic articles within New 
Zealand—which right the state seeks to vindicate. The vindication is not 
 
 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. [77]. 
 275. See supra notes 173–74 and 211 and accompanying text; Dodge, supra note 230, at 161 
(―However, when the foreign law at issue is public—criminal, tax, antitrust, or securities law, for 
example—courts will neither apply that law to decide a case nor enforce the decision of a foreign court 
applying that law.‖). See also, e.g., Felix D. Strebel, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and 
Foreign Public Law, 21 LOY. L.A. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 55 (1999) (―This general refusal to 
recognize foreign public law in enforcement proceedings has been described as the ‗public law 
taboo.‘‖). 
 276. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [11] (citing DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS art. 3(1) (14th ed. 2006)). 
 277. Id. [79]. Iran counters that the relevant law is ―partrimonial‖ and not penal and therefore 
enforceable in England. Id. [84]. The court described ―patrimonial‖ claims by the following: ―Thus 
there would be no infringement of the principle governing justiciability if the English Courts were to 
enforce a proprietary claim by a foreign sovereign state in relation to movables acquired by that State 
(whether by purchase, bequest, gift . . . ) at a time when the movables were within the territory of that 
state.‖ Id. [85]. However, Iran does not claim to have acquired the Jiroft objects in this way; it 
contends that ―it assumed‖ ownership of the articles. Id. [86]. 
 278. Id. [83] (citing DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS, supra note 276, para. 5-027). 
 279. [1984] A.C. 1 (Eng.). 
 280. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [83].  
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sought by the acquisition of the article in exchange for proper 
compensation. The vindication is sought through confiscation.‖281 
The Barakat I Court, after comparing Iran‘s Legal Bill of 1979 with the 
New Zealand statute, found that they have the same purpose — protection 
of antiquities.
282
 Furthermore, the court found that the Legal Bill ―imposes 
penal sanctions for invasion of the public right,‖ just as the New Zealand 
statute vindicated the public right through ―confiscation.‖283 Therefore, 
because this is an action to ―enforce a public right of state ownership,‖ and 
because the obligatory penalties ―for the vindication of that public right 
include imprisonment and seizure[,] . . . the Iranian legislation is properly 
characterised as ‗penal.‘‖284 
B. Court of Appeal—Iranian Laws Did Vest Ownership 
On appeal, the higher English court addressed the same two issues as 
did the Queen‘s Bench: whether Iran obtained ownership of the Jiroft 
material under Iranian law and, if so, whether an English court should 
recognize and enforce that title.
285
 The appellate court approached these 
issues in the following manner: ―i) [w]hat is the interest in moveable 
property that a claimant must show in order to found a claim in conversion 
in this jurisdiction? ii) What, if any, interest in the antiquities does Iran 
enjoy? iii) Does that right found a cause of action in conversion under 
English law?‖286 Each of these issues will be addressed in turn. 
Iran‘s action claimed conversion.287 The court referenced the Torts 
(Interference with Goods) Act 1977, which defines ―wrongful interference 
with goods‖ to mean ―conversion of goods‖ as well as other things.288 The 
Act acknowledges that ―it is possible to enjoy different interests in 
goods,‖289 but it does not define ―possessory‖ or ―proprietary‖ title.290 This 
court undertook a review of the authorities and case law which provided 
 
 
 281. [1984] A.C. 1, 34 (Eng.). 
 282. See Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [87]. 
 283. Id. [88]. 
 284. Id. 91. The court also undertook a discussion of whether the relevant Iranian laws were 
―public‖ laws. It found that because the Legal Bill is ―seeking to protect the interests of the State of 
Iran in recovering items of that country‘s natural heritage and seeking further to enforce the right to 
delivery up which has under Iranian law . . . become vested in the State,‖ it is a ―paradigm example of 
a public law.‖ Id. [99]. 
 285. Barakat II, [2007] EWCA (CIV) 1374, [6] (Eng.). 
 286. Id. [11]. 
 287. Id. [12]. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. [14]. 
 290. Id. [15]. 
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contrasting views as to whether ―possessory‖ or ―proprietary‖ title was 
needed to bring an action in conversion.
291
 
The lower court relied on Jarvis v. Williams,
292
 which held that a 
―claimant in conversion had to show not merely an immediate right to 
possession but a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the claim.‖293 
The Court of Appeal cited a conflicting opinion found in International 
Factors Ltd. v. Rodriguez, which held that an individual with a right to 
immediate possession may sue ―‗even the owner of the chattel for 
wrongfully interfering with this right.‘‖294 Ultimately, the court 
―reconciled‖ the two cases295 and did not overturn the conclusion that ―a 
claimant in conversion must demonstrate some proprietary right in the 
goods . . . .‖296 
In deciding what type of ownership interest Iran has under Iranian law, 
the appellate court initially noted that the lower, Queen‘s Bench court 
cited ―no judicial or academic authority on the central question‖—mainly 
whether the 1979 Legal Bill vested ownership of the Jiroft materials in the 
state.
297
 The lower court had been satisfied with the assistance the experts 
for Iran and Barakat provided, but ―preferred‖ the conclusions of 
Barakat‘s expert without making a judgment on ―credibility, or 
expertise.‖298 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal stated that ―it is important to bear in 
mind that it is not the label which foreign law gives to the legal 
relationship, but its substance, which is relevant.‖299 Thus, the issue the 
court was concerned with here was whether the ownership rights enjoyed 
by Iran ―equate to those that give standing to sue in conversion under 
English law.‖300 In undertaking this analysis, the court looked to the Civil 
Code, the National Heritage Protection Act of 1930, and the Legal Bill of 
1979. These will be considered in turn. 
First, the appellate court agreed with the general findings of the 
Queen‘s Bench court with regard to the Civil Code, which it found did not 
 
 
 291. Id. [19]–[30]. 
 292. Id. [31] (citing Jarris v. Williams, [1955] 1 WLR 71 (Eng.). 
 293. Id. [28] (citing Int‘l Factors Ltd. v. Rodriguez, [1979] 1 Q.B. 351 (Eng.)). 
 294. Id. [29] (citing MCC Proceeds Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Int‘l (Eur.), [1998] 4 All E.R. 675 
(discussing Rodriguez, [1979] 1 W.B. 352)). 
 295. Barakat II, [2007] EWCA 1374, [30]. 
 296. Id. [31]. 
 297. Id. [48]. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. [49]. 
 300. Id. 
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to vest ownership of the Jiroft materials in Iran.
301
 Second, although the 
appellate court partially questioned the Queen‘s Bench court‘s analysis of 
the National Heritage Protection Act of 1930,
302
 it ultimately agreed with 
the Queen‘s Bench court‘s conclusion that the Act‘s articles did not lend 
support to Iran‘s broad contention that ―all antiquities were owned by the 
state.‖303 The ―lack of clarity‖ in the relevant articles as to when the State 
becomes an owner is more in line with Barakat‘s evidence ―that the finder 
is the owner unless and until antiquities are transferred to the State.‖304 
Finally, the appellate court turned to the Legal Bill of 1979 and noted 
that it is the ―clinching statutory provision‖ of Iran‘s action.305 Iran again 
conceded that there is no specific language ―vesting‖ ownership in the 
state.
306
 However, it argued that ownership is determined by rights, such as 
―the right of exclusive enjoyment, the right of alienation, [and] the right of 
recovering possession,‖ and, based on the rights that it had, it was 
effectively the owner, notwithstanding the lack of specific statutory 
language of vesting.
307
 
The appellate court undertook its analysis of the Legal Bill of 1979 by 
trying to identify someone, other than Iran, who could be the owner of any 
cultural objects discovered.
308
 The court first noted that the third provision 
of the Legal Bill
309
 provides that the finder of items less than 100 years old 
becomes the owner upon paying one-fifth their value to the state, but that 
the provision does not indicate who the owner is prior to making such a 
payment.
310
 Next, the court noted that the second provision of the Legal 
Bill does not let the accidental discoverer benefit from his find ―other than 
by obtaining the statutory reward.‖311 In relation, the court noted that 
because the first provision deals with an ―illegal‖ finder, such a person can 
 
 
 301. Id. [55]–[57]. 
 302. Id. [60] (noting that article 10 ―gives the state the option of becoming (or remaining) the 
owner of the other half. The words . . . placed in brackets reflect the fact that it is perhaps arguable that 
the language is sufficiently imprecise so as to accommodate the possibility that antiquities vest in the 
state when they are found . . .‖). In addition, this court found that Article 14, as described by Article 31 
of the Regulations, appears to ―vest the state‘s share in the state as owner, rather than mere possessor.‖ 
Id. [61]. 
 303. Id. [58]. 
 304. Id. [62]. 
 305. Id. [63]. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. [66] (noting that ―[t]his is a question that the judge [below] did not expressly address 
. . .‖). 
 309. See infra Part III for the Legal Bill of 1979. 
 310. Barakat II, [2007] EWCA 1374, [68]. 
 311. Id. [69]. 
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be in no better position than the ―accidental‖ finder who could not benefit 
from his discovery.
312
 
Next, the court referenced the meaning of ownership, defined in 
Halsbury‟s Laws of England: ―Ownership consists of innumerable rights 
over property, for example the rights of exclusive enjoyment, of 
destruction, alteration and alienation, and of maintaining and recovering 
possession of the property from all other persons. Those rights are 
conceived not as separately existing, but as merged in one general right of 
ownership.‖313 The court concluded that ―[u]nder the Legal Bill of 1979 
the finder of antiquities enjoys none of these attributes of ownership.‖314 
After analyzing the rights of the finder under the Legal Bill, the court 
turned to those of Iran. ―Iran is entitled to immediate possession of any 
antiquities found,‖ because the second provision provides that the finder 
must ―submit them‖ to the authorities ―as soon as possible.‖315 
Furthermore, ―[t]here has been no dispute that once the antiquities are 
handed over, they become the property of Iran.‖316 Additionally, in the 
case of the ―illegal‖ finder, they are ―subject to ‗seizure‘ by Iran‖ as stated 
in the first provision.
317
 Therefore, except for the accidental finder‘s 
reward payment, ―no one enjoys any rights in relation to antiquities found 
accidentally or as a result of illegal excavation except Iran. . . . [T]he rights 
that Iran enjoys are essentially the rights of ownership.‖318 
In summary, because the accidental discoverer and the illegal finder of 
antiquities do not enjoy general rights of ownership under the Legal Bill of 
 
 
 312. Id. [70]. 
 313. Id. [73] (citing 35 Halsbury‘s Laws of England para. 1227 (reprt., 4th ed. 1994)). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. [74]–[75] (noting that ―[i]f they are not handed over, but are transferred by the finder to a 
third party, the third party will get no title and the antiquities will be subject to ‗seizure‘‖). 
 316. Id. [74]. 
 317. Id. [75]. 
 318. Id. The court then rejected the various arguments proffered by Barakat as to why the Legal 
Bill did not grant Iran ownership. First, the Farsi word ―zabt‖ ―can mean both ‗seizure‘ and 
‗confiscation.‘‖ Id. [77]. The court stated that the word could be used to describe both ―confiscation of 
equipment owned by the excavator and taking possession of antiquities in respect of which Iran had 
the rights of the owner.‖ Id. [78]. Second, Barakat argued that the Legal Bill acts ―in personam.‖ Id. 
[76]. The court found this to be an ―arid‖ issue, stating that although the obligations imposed by the 
bill are ―personal obligations‖ and the right to seizure is a ―personal right,‖ ―these rights none the less 
[sic] inferentially affect title.‖ Id. [79]–[80]. Third, Barakat contended that a clear and express vesting 
statute could have been included in the bill. Id. [76]. The court noted that this bill ―was enacted as an 
urgent response to the pillaging of antiquities which took place immediately after the revolution.‖ Id. 
[82]. Furthermore, ―it is possible that the draftsman started from the premise that antiquities were 
owned by Iran.‖ Id. However, the court reiterated that it does not matter because the ―clear effect of 
the Legal Bill was to vest title to antiquities in Iran . . . .‖ Id. Finally, the court did not attach any 
significance to the fact that there is no record of previous litigation where Iran is seeking the return of 
antiquities in a civil proceeding. Id. [83]. 
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1979, because Iran is entitled to immediate possession of found 
antiquities, and because once handed over they become the property of 
Iran under the bill, the court concluded that Iran had demonstrated that it 
was the owner of the Jiroft objects.
319
  
The appellate court divided the conversion issue into two sub-issues: 
(1) whether Iran‘s interest could be the basis of a conversion action, and 
(2) whether the claim is non-justiciable in England because its relevant 
law is either penal or public.
320
 Each will be considered in turn. 
First, regarding whether Iran‘s interest could sustain a conversion 
claim, the court noted that ―[u]nder English law the owner of a chattel who 
has an immediate right to possession of it has a right to sue in 
conversion.‖321 Under England‘s conflict of laws principles, the court 
determined that the immediate right to possession should be considered by 
the law of Iran as the lex situs.
322
 As stated previously, the court found that 
Iran ―enjoys both title and an immediate right to possession of the 
antiquities under the law of Iran.‖323 Therefore, Iran‘s interest can give rise 
to a conversion action.
324
 
The second issue is whether Iran is seeking to enforce a foreign penal 
or public law, or whether the claim is patrimonial, as Iran maintains.
325
 
Penal laws are unenforceable because crimes ―are only cognisable and 
punishable in the country where they were committed . . . .‖326 Public laws 
refer to the ―exercise or assertion of a sovereign right,‖327 and, as such, are 
also unenforceable. Patrimonial claims involve a country asserting its 
―rights of ownership.‖328 The court stated that whether a foreign law is to 
be considered ―penal‖ depends on English law and not on the label given 
 
 
 319. Id. [84] (Furthermore, the court stated that had it not reached this conclusion it would have 
determined that ―under Iranian law, Iran had an immediate right to possession of the antiquities that 
would vest ownership on taking possession.‖ Id. 
 320. Id. [85]. 
 321. Id. [86]. 
 322. Id. ―Lex situs‖ means the ―law of the place where property is located.‖ BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY 932 (8th ed. 1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 222 et. 
seq. (1971)). See Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the International 
Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 239, 240 (2004) 
(providing discussion of lex situs doctrine in civil and common law nations).  
 323. Barakat II, [2007] EWCA 1374, [86]. 
 324. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that ―[h]ad we not formed this view, we would have 
concluded that Iran enjoyed an immediate right to their possession under the law of Iran which of itself 
would suffice to found a claim in conversion in this jurisdiction.‖ Id. 
 325. Id. [87]. 
 326. Id. [105]. 
 327. Id. [125]. 
 328. Id. [131]. See supra note 168. 
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to it by the foreign state.
329
 ―The English court has to determine the 
substance of the right sought to be enforced, and whether its enforcement 
would, directly or indirectly, involve the execution of the penal law of 
another state.‖330 Furthermore, ―[i]t follows that a law may be 
characterised as penal even if it does not form part of the criminal code of 
a foreign country.‖331 Finally, just because a provision can be found within 
a law containing criminal penalties does not mean ―that the provision itself 
is penal in nature.‖332 
Applying this reasoning to the case at hand, the court concluded that 
the Queen‘s Bench was in error in holding the 1979 Legal Bill to be a 
penal law.
333
 It acknowledged that a large part of the bill was penal, but 
stated that although some provisions ―impose penalties,‖ this does not 
make all other provisions of the Legal Bill penal in nature.
334
 The 
modifications that the bill made with regard ―to ownership of antiquities 
were not penal or confiscatory . . . . They altered the law as to the 
ownership of antiquities that had not yet been found, with the effect that 
these would all be owned by the state . . . .‖335 These provisions, the court 
reasoned, were not penal provisions.
336
 
Next, the court turned to whether the 1979 Legal Bill is enforceable as 
a public law. As stated in Rule 3(1) of Dicey, Morris and Collins on the 
Conflict of Laws, ―English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an 
action for the enforcement . . . of a penal, revenue or other public law of a 
foreign state . . . .‖337 After a review of the authorities and case law, the 
court found that ―the only category outside penal and revenue laws which 
is the subject of an actual decision, as opposed to dicta, is a claim which 
involves the exercise or assertion of a sovereign right.‖338 It stated that a 
―helpful and practical test‖339 in deciding whether a law will be enforced is 
 
 
 329. Barakat II, [2007] EWCA 1374, [106]. 
 330. Id. (citing Huntington v. Attrill [1893] A.C. 150, 156 (Eng.); Att‘y-Gen. of N.Z. v. Ortiz, 
[1984] A.C. 1, 32 (Eng.)). 
 331. Id. [108] (citing Ortiz, [1984] A.C. 1, at 33 (Eng.)). 
 332. Id. [109]. 
 333. Id. [111]. 
 334. Id. (―The 1979 Legal Bill was in large part penal in that it created criminal offences with 
criminal penalties for unlawfully excavating or dealing with antiquities.‖). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Barakat I, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, [11]. The part of Rule 3(1) referring to ―other public 
law‖ originally appeared as ―political law.‖ Barakat II, [2007] EWCA 1374, [112]. 
 ―Political law‖ was replaced by ―other public law‖ in the seventh edition of Dicey, Morris and Collins 
on the Conflict of Laws, and was meant to be the ―equivalent to ‗prerogative right.‘‖ Id. [113]. 
 338. Id. [125]. 
 339. Id. 
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―whether ‗the central interest‘ of the state in bringing the action is 
governmental in nature.‖340 Finally, the court determined that there is no 
binding decision preventing the ―enforcement of all foreign public 
laws;‖341 laws that will not be enforced are ones that ―involve[] the 
exercise or assertion of a sovereign right . . . .‖342  
Third, Barakat conceded that if Iran had obtained ―actual possession‖ 
of the Jiroft antiquities, it could have acquired the title necessary to 
enforce a ―patrimonial claim,‖343 where a country asserts its ―rights of 
ownership.‖344 However, Barakat argued that Iran cannot claim conversion 
because it never ―perfected its title‖ by acquiring ―possession of the 
antiquities,‖345 and, as such, Iran was seeking to enforce Iranian 
sovereignty in England.
346
 
The court concluded that Iran was seeking to enforce a patrimonial 
claim, asserting title to cultural material, a part of its ―national heritage,‖ 
via legislation implemented in 1979.
347
 Because of this, the court held that 
Iran‘s action could be maintained even though it had not taken ―actual 
possession‖ of the Jiroft objects; it is not ―a claim based on its compulsory 
acquisition from private owners,‖ but a patrimonial one.348  
Finally, the court assumed, arguendo, that if this was a claim to enforce 
a foreign public law, ―it should [not] be precluded by any general principle 
that this country will not entertain an action whose object is to enforce the 
public law of another state.‖349 Furthermore, the court reasoned there are 
―positive reasons of policy‖ why Iran‘s claim to recover part of its 
―national heritage . . . should not be shut out.‖350 The court acknowledged 
 
 
 340. Id. [118] (citing Att‘y-Gen. (U.K.) v. Heinemann Publ‘rs Austl. Pty. Ltd., (1988) 165 C.L.R. 
30). 
 341. Id. [125] (emphasis added). 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. [87] 
 344. Id. [131]. 
 345. Id. [87]. 
 346. Id. [93]. 
 347. Id. [93], [149]. 
 348. Id. [149]. The court noted earlier that the ―universal rule‖ is that ―title to movables depends 
on the lex situs . . . [and therefore a] transfer of a tangible movable which is valid and effective by the 
law of the country where the movable is at the time of the transfer is valid and effective in England  
. . . .‖ Id. [132] (citing 2 DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS rule 124, para. 
24R-0001 (14th ed. 2006)). The court further stated that ―[w]here the foreign state has acquired title 
under its law to property within its jurisdiction in cases not involving compulsory acquisition of title 
from private parties, there is no reason in principle why the English court should not recognise its title 
in accordance with the general principle.‖ Id. [133]. The court also noted that in United States v. 
Schultz, the United States recognised the patrimonial rights of a foreign state ―even where the State 
never had possession.‖ Id. [150] (citing United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 349. Id. [151]. 
 350. Id. [154]. 
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a global recognition of the importance for international cooperation in 
order ―to prevent the unlawful removal of cultural objects including 
antiquities,‖351 citing the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
and certain provisions therein.
352
 The court recognized that even though 
these international efforts do not directly affect this case, ―they do 
illustrate the international acceptance of the desirability of protection of 
the national heritage.‖353 
In summary, because Iran demonstrated that it was the owner of the 
Jiroft objects it can maintain a conversion action.
354
 Furthermore, because 
the 1979 Legal Bill is not a penal law and because Iran was seeking to 
enforce a patrimonial claim, the claim is justiciable in England.
355
  
C. Which Barakat Court was Correct? 
Although some antiquities collectors may have been alarmed by a 
cursory reading of the court of appeal‘s opinion, fearing it unjustly 
enforced a source nation‘s law that fell short of full vesting, the court of 
appeal, which found that Iranian law did vest ownership and that it was 
justiciable in England, was correct for the following reasons.  
 
 
 351. Id. [155]. 
 352. Id. [156], [161] (noting that the United Kingdom has ratified UNESCO, but not UNIDROIT). 
Iran has ratified UNIDROIT. See UNESCO, supra note 176, at section (C)(2). UNESCO article 2(2) 
states that ―States Parties undertake to oppose such practices [e.g., the illicit import, export and transfer 
of cultural property ownership] with the means at their disposal and particularly by removing their 
causes, putting a stop to current practices, and by helping to make the necessary reparations.‖ Id. art. 
2(2). Article 13 states that members undertake, consistent with the laws of each State:  
(a) to prevent by all appropriate means transfers of ownership of cultural property likely to 
promote the illicit import or export of such property; (b) to ensure that their competent 
services co-operate in facilitating the earliest possible restitution of illicitly exported cultural 
property to its rightful owner; (c) to admit actions for recovery of lost or stolen items of 
cultural property brought by or on behalf of the rightful owners; (d) to recognize the 
indefeasible right of each State Party to this Convention to classify and declare certain 
cultural property as inalienable which should therefore ipso facto not be exported, and to 
facilitate recovery of such property by the State concerned in cases where it has been 
exported. 
Id. art. 13. UNIDROIT article 3(2) states that ―a cultural object which has been unlawfully excavated 
or lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained shall be considered stolen .‖ UNIDROIT Convention on 
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1330, available at http:// 
unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/1995culturalproperty-e.pdf. Article 5(1) states 
that ―[a] Contracting State may request the court or other competent authority of another Contracting 
State to order the return of a cultural object illegally exported from the territory of the requesting 
State.‖ Id. art. 5(1). 
 353. Barakat II, [2007] EWCA (CIV) 1374, [163]. 
 354. See supra notes 320–25.  
 355. See supra notes 326–34. 
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The first reason is that the lower court opinion was inadequate as a 
matter of process. As the court of appeal acknowledged, the Queen‘s 
Bench did not undertake any review of the authorities as to whether 
Iranian law vested ownership of the cultural objects in the state.
356
 The 
judge indicated only a preference for the conclusions of Barakat‘s expert 
after indicating his satisfaction with both experts and without considering 
their respective credibility and expertise.
357
 On the other hand, the 
appellate court undertook an in-depth analysis as to ownership of 
discovered antiquities under the Legal Bill of 1979. 
The second reason is a matter of logical reading of the Iranian law. The 
court of appeal‘s analysis of the Legal Bill of 1979 is very persuasive. It 
looked at the ―substance‖ of the legislation and past the fact that the bill 
contained no express vesting statute language. Specifically, the court was 
unable to identify anyone, other than Iran, that could be the owner of 
found antiquities, either accidentally or illegally discovered. As stated, the 
purpose of the bill is to prevent the plundering of antiquities and their 
subsequent exportation in order to protect Iran‘s heritage. Excavation of 
antiquities is ―absolutely forbidden,‖ resulting in the State‘s seizure of any 
found items.
358
 Accidentally found antiquities must be turned in to the 
nearest authorities ―as soon as possible,‖ with an award payment made to 
the finder.
359
 Logically, the finder is not the owner, and Iran enjoys the 
rights of ownership. 
Third, a comparison of other vesting or nationalization statutes yields 
the conclusion that the Legal Bill of 1979 conclusively places ownership 
of found antiquities with the State. For example, Polish legislation states 
that ―[a]rchaeological excavations and findings are the property of the 
State,‖360 and Peru‘s law provides that all ―archaeological sites belong to 
the state.‖361 In addition, Egypt‘s Law 117, which was at issue in Schultz, 
―prescribes the procedure to be followed by persons in possession of 
antiquities at the time the Law takes effect, and by persons who discover 
antiquities thereafter.‖362 ―It [also] sets forth serious criminal penalties for 
the violation of its provisions,‖ among other requirements.363 
 
 
 356. See supra note 299. 
 357. See supra note 299. 
 358. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 247 and 257 and accompanying text.  
 360. Borodkin, supra note 166, at 392 n.103 (citing Law on the Protection of Cultural Property 
and on Museums art. 24 (1962) (Pol.) (cited in LYNDEL V. PROTT & P.J. O‘KEEFE, LAW AND THE 
CULTURAL HERITAGE (1984))). 
 361. Borodkin, supra note 166, at 395 n.124. 
 362. United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 363. Id. 
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Even though the language of the Legal Bill does not contain specific 
phrases such as ―property of the state‖ or ―belong to the state,‖ as 
discussed earlier, the Legal Bill as a whole vests ownership with Iran. 
Iran‘s bill provides that excavations are illegal, and illegal and accidental 
discoveries ultimately become property of the state,
364
 yielding the same 
result as Poland‘s and Peru‘s laws. Furthermore, the Legal Bill compares 
with Egypt‘s Law 117, providing a process to be followed upon 
excavation and accidental discovery of cultural objects and providing 
criminal penalties for violations.
365
 Therefore, even though the language is 
different, the resulting effect and meaning of Iran‘s legislation compares 
strongly with that of Poland, Peru and Egypt. 
Finally, the court‘s reasoning in its discussion regarding whether the 
claim is justiciable is sound. As the court stated, the Legal Bill has 
criminal penalties.
366
 However, the overall scheme is not one of 
punishment, but one regarding the ownership of cultural material not yet 
discovered, ultimately resulting in state ownership.
367
 As concluded by the 
court of appeal, Iran is seeking to enforce a ―patrimonial claim‖ in 
England—not its sovereignty.368  
In summary, because Iran‘s enjoyment of rights of ownership under the 
1979 Legal Bill was clear, because a comparison of other foreign 
patrimony laws further indicates Iran‘s right to ownership, because the bill 
was found to be justiciable in England, and because such foreign 
patrimony laws are recognizable across borders and under English law, the 
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) was correct in its findings. 
D. What is Barakat‟s Potential Impact on Rubin?  
Turning to the potential impact on the Rubin litigation, the plaintiffs 
and museums involved are very interested in the Barakat reasoning and 
outcome.
369
 However, the impact should be minimal for a number of 
reasons. First, the objects at issue in Barakat were assumed to be from 
―recent excavations in the Jiroft region,‖ as alleged by Iran, for the 
purposes of trial.
370
 As such, Iran‘s Legal Bill of 1979—the clinching 
legislation in Iran‘s case and the law relied upon by the Court of Appeal 
 
 
 364. See supra note 148. 
 365. See supra note 148. 
 366. See supra note 224. 
 367. See supra note 225. 
 368. See supra note 238. 
 369. See supra note 107. 
 370. Barakat II, [2007] EWCA (CIV) 1374, [4] (emphasis added). 
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(Civil Division) to find state ownership—was in place prior to the illegal 
excavation of the Jiroft objects, vesting ownership of the antiquities in the 
Iranian State. That may not be the case for the objects at issue in the Rubin 
litigation.  
As stated previously, in the Massachusetts litigation, the court 
determined that the property in question remains ―blocked‖ according to 
the TRIA such that if the plaintiffs can demonstrate Iranian ownership of 
the cultural objects, those assets ―will be subject to attachment and 
execution.‖371 The Rubin plaintiffs have stated in general that ―upon 
information and belief‖ Harvard and the Boston Museum of Fine Arts 
possess property belonging to Iran.
372
 The only specific claim relates to 
objects that Harvard contends were donated by Grenville L. Winthrop in 
1937 at the time of his death.
373
 As discussed in Part III above, the United 
States will recognize foreign patrimony laws. However, as clearly stated in 
McClain, the ―declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal 
exportation of an article can be considered theft.‖374 Therefore, the Rubin 
plaintiffs will need to prove that the objects they allege are available for 
judgment satisfaction were discovered after the enactment of the Legal 
Bill of 1979. 
Furthermore, the impact on the Illinois litigation involving the Field 
Museum‘s Herzfeld Collection also is questionable. The Illinois court has 
not determined yet whether any of the collections at issue are ―blocked‖ 
assets under the TRIA. As noted before, Iran would not ―affirmatively 
state‖ that it did not own the museum‘s antiquities, only that Iran has 
never claimed ownership.
375
 The plaintiffs have argued that Iran does own 
the artifacts, alleging that they became the property of Iran by ―operation 
of . . . law‖ when the items were excavated.376 However, the Herzfeld 
Collection was excavated by Professor Herzfeld in the early part of the 
twentieth century prior to the enactment of the Legal Bill of 1979 which 
would vest ownership in Iran.
377
 Again, the Rubin plaintiffs will need to 
prove that the Herzfeld Collection was discovered after the enactment of 
the Legal Bill, an unlikely outcome. 
 
 
 371. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 456 F. Supp. 2d 228, 236 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 372. Id. at 230. 
 373. Wawrzyniak, supra note 53, at 12. 
 374. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 375. See supra Part II. 
 376. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370, 2007 WL 2219105, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 
26, 2007). 
 377. See supra note 30. 
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For the Oriental Institute, which has maintained that Iran owns the 
Chogha Mish Collection, the Barakat decision should not have an impact 
at all. The plaintiffs are seeking to demonstrate that the Chogha Mish 
Collection is ―blocked‖ for other reasons, including presence before the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the possibility that the Institute, at 
some point, did not recognize Iran‘s title.378 
Another issue to be considered is whether U.S. courts would give res 
judicata effect to the English court‘s finding of Iranian ownership of 
discovered antiquities per the Legal Bill of 1979. A ―final judgment of a 
court of a foreign state . . . determining interests in property, is conclusive 
between the parties, and is entitled to recognition in courts in the United 
States.‖379 Because Iran is a party to the English litigation as well as the 
U.S. litigation, the issue of whether Iranian law vests ownership of 
antiquities could be precluded may be argued, but it should not succeed.
380
  
The core requirements for an issue decided in another case against a 
party to preclude re-litigation of the same issue in a second case could be 
stated as: (1) the same issue was decided under roughly similar procedural 
conditions; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided; (3) the 
litigation ended with a valid and final judgment; and (4) the issue 
determined was essential to the judgment.
381
  
Central is the fact that two different laws are at issue: in Barakat it was 
the Legal Bill of 1979, whereas in Rubin it is the National Heritage 
Protection Act of 1930. Moreover, the Restatement indicates that issue 
preclusion underlies ―confidence that the result reached is substantially 
correct. [However, w]here a determination relied on as preclusive is itself 
inconsistent with some other adjudication of the same issue, that 
confidence is generally unwarranted.‖382 Therefore, because two different 
English courts reached different conclusions, perhaps U.S. courts would 
not preclude the issue and would allow it to be re-litigated. This could be 
key to the Rubin plaintiffs‘ ultimate victory because, as mentioned above, 
it is incredibly unlikely that they could establish that any parts of the 
 
 
 378. See supra note 75. The United States and U.S. citizens are still pursuing claims before the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal which was established pursuant to the Algiers Accords. See, e.g., 
PRESIDENT‘S PERIODIC REPORT ON NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE 1979 IRANIAN 
EMERGENCY AND ASSETS BLOCKING, H.R. DOC. NO. 106-312 (2000). 
 379. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 
(1986). 
 380. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1980). 
 381. See, e.g., id. § 27. Accord, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).  
 382. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. f (1980). 
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various collections were discovered after the enactment of the Legal Bill 
of 1979.  
Furthermore, foreign judgments generally are enforceable from one 
country to another under the intricate doctrine of comity.
383
 Additionally, 
Illinois, like all U.S. states, has a statute allowing the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.
384
 The United States is not required to 
accept and acknowledge foreign judgments and awards.
385
 However, 
courts in the United States have ―considerable discretion in deciding 
whether a foreign judgment or award is to be recognized or enforced.‖386 
As such, the Illinois and Massachusetts courts could utilize the doctrine of 
comity in order to give effect to the English court‘s judgment establishing 
Iranian ownership per the Legal Bill of 1979, but they should not. 
In summary, a factual determination of Iranian ownership has not been 
made in the Rubin litigation. However, because the FSIA‘s presumption of 
immunity was not overcome by the commercial activity exception,
387
 and 
because the TRIA will likely figure as the key statute for judgment 
recovery, a factual determination is likely forthcoming. Determination of 
ownership is necessary for the courts to identify what assets are 
―contested‖ and thus still ―blocked‖ and subject to execution under the 
TRIA. In the litigation against Harvard University, the Boston Museum of 
Fine Arts and the Field Museum, the Barakat decision likely will not 
control the outcome.  
 
 
 383. See generally, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Treaties and the 
Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT‘L L. 675 (2003) (providing analysis of the intricacies of the 
doctrine). The classic definition of comity can be found in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 
(1895):  
―Comity,‖ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of 
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of 
other persons who are under the protection of its laws. 
 384. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-620 (2009). 
 385. Id. at 344. 
 386. Id. 
 387. However, given the recent changes in the FSIA—specifically those dealing with the 
―commercial activity‖ exception—and the subsequent filing of a new lawsuit by the Rubin plaintiffs, 
the FSIA likely will continue as a key statute for judgment recovery, in addition to the TRIA. See 
supra notes 59–60. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Rubin litigation is tragic, and both the Rubin and Peterson 
plaintiffs deserve compensation they likely never will receive. As 
discussed above, because U.S. law should not permit execution against the 
artifacts subject to the enforcement proceedings, the final judgments held 
by both sets of plaintiffs will probably not be enforced in the currently 
pending proceedings. Further, given that both cases resulted in default 
judgments with incredibly high damage awards at levels that would not 
have been awarded by the courts in any other nation, it is doubtful that the 
judgments would be enforceable in any other country, much less Iran.
388
 
Some literature looking at the cases has called for the creation of a new 
fund to compensate the victims
389—although doing so is counter to the 
purely theoretical deterrence and punishment goals of the vacuous anti-
terrorism legislation that duped the plaintiffs into suing Iran in the first 
place.
390
 Given the current state of the economy, a new fund is an unlikely 
prospect. 
Even more tragic is the fact that the legislative scheme has pitted 
terrorism victims against each other. Terrorism victims to date have 
received very little compensation.
391
 The Rubin plaintiffs now also are 
fighting off the victims of the 1983 Hezbollah Beirut bombing, the 
Peterson plaintiffs, who want their share of the artifact sale proceeds.
392
 
David Strachman, attorney for the Rubin plaintiffs, was quoted in regard to 
this development: ―[i]t‘s unseemly for lawyers for one group of victims to 
 
 
 388. See Strauss, supra note 6, at 319; Hoye, supra note 7, at 137 (noting that anti-terrorism cases 
―are made by the courts of the United States, solely to protect its own citizens against actions by other 
states‖ and raise issues of ―fairness, objectivity, and credibility of the decisional law that has 
developed or will develop in this context‖). 
 389. See Plaster, supra note 83, at 553–54; Hoye, supra note 7, at 149; Kelly A. Atherton, 
Compensating Victims under the “Terrorism-Exception” of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A 
State-Sponsored Victim‟s Compensation Fund, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT‘L L. & DISP. RESOL. 158, 173–
74 (2004); Walter W. Heiser, Civil Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of International 
Terrorism, 3 SAN DIEGO INT‘L L.J. 1, 47–48 (2002) (discussing 2001 legislation requiring the 
President to establish a ―comprehensive program to ensure fair, equitable, and prompt compensation 
for all United States victims of international terrorism . . .‖ and Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000); Deborah M. Mostaghel, Wrong Place, Wrong Time, Unfair Treatment? Aid to 
Victims of Terrorist Attacks, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 83 (2001) (calling for unification of laws providing 
relief to victims of terrorism). But see Donna M. Balducci, Note, American Taxpayers Bear the Burden 
of Beating Iraq in the Courtroom, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 819 (2003) (criticizing likely passage of 
legislation to pay victims of Iraq-sponsored terrorism after enforcement of exorbitant judgments 
proves impossible). 
 390. E.g., Strauss, supra note 6, at 310.  
 391. Hegna, 376 F.3d at 489 n.14. 
 392. See supra note 15.  
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undermine collection actions of other victims.‖393 Perhaps it is, but would 
it not be malpractice for counsel for the Peterson plaintiffs to sit back and 
watch while the last available Iranian assets in the United States are 
auctioned to pay a later-obtained judgment? The cases are not just about 
abstractions of justice; they involve severely injured people and those who 
care for them who need money. A potential sale certainly would not bring 
in enough to satisfy one judgment—let alone two.394  
Finally, despite Judge Lamberth‘s hopes that an ―extremely sizeable 
judgment will serve to aid in the healing process for these plaintiffs, and 
simultaneously sound an alarm to the defendants that their unlawful 
attacks on our citizens will not be tolerated,‖395 and despite testimony in 
the Peterson litigation by Dr. Patrick Clawson, deputy director of the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, ―‗that civil judgments for acts 
of state-sponsored terrorism have had a noticeable impact upon the present 
regime in Iran,‘‖396 it is completely naïve to believe that civil anti-
terrorism trials against Iran—or enforcement against the few Iranian 
artifacts in the country—are having any deterrent effect whatsoever.397 In 
fact, the litigation may be affirmatively interfering with the executive 
branch‘s foreign policy in the Middle East.398 That is the entire point of the 
Department of Justice Statement of Interest filings.  
 
 
 393. E.g., Newbart, supra note 81. 
 394. Cf. Shirley J. Foster, An American Inquiry into Contemporary Terrorist Accountability, 6 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 513, 528 (2002) (discussing limited funds problem in the context of satisfying 
multiple staggering default judgments against nations on State Department list of nations sponsoring 
terrorism). 
 395. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25, 60 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 396. Jack D. Smith & Gregory J. Cooper, Disrupting Terrorist Financing with Civil Litigation, 41 
CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 65, 79 (2009).  
 397. E.g., Plaster, supra note 83, at 553. Indeed, it may be worse yet: ―Since there are many states 
that would consider the United States a state sponsor of terrorism, the United States should expect to 
be haled into diverse foreign domestic courts by victims of ‗terrorists‘ funded and supplied by the 
United States, and should, collaterally, expect to see its foreign assets attached to satisfy judgments.‖ 
Keith Sealing, ―State Sponsors of Terrorism” Is a Question, Not an Answer: The Terrorism 
Amendment to the FSIA Make Less Sense Now Than It Did Before 9/11, 38 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 119, 121 
(2003). Iran and Cuba each have passed legislation encouraging retaliatory suits in their courts. 
Atherton, supra note 389, at 173–74.  
 398. See, e.g., Press Release, National Iranian American Council, Tell the Department of Justice 
to Prevent Ancient Persian Artifacts from Being Sold (Dec. 26, 2006) (on file with author) 
(―Manouchehr Mottaki, the Foreign Minister of Iran [sic] has threatened to cancel proposed 
negotiations with the US while Hamid Reza Asefi, the Iranian Foreign Spokesman, has called on the 
US to show a quick and serious reaction to the case.‖). President Obama was recently quoted: ―The 
American people have great respect for the people of Iran and their rich history.‖ Press Release, The 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement By President Barack Obama on Iran (Nov. 3, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-barack-obama-
iran.  
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In conclusion, Congress should stop usurping foreign policy decisions 
to indulge in political posturing that inflicts further pain on terrorism 
victims, stop trying to foist nonsensical amendments to the FSIA on the 
judicial branch, and leave the rapidly changing war on terror, at least 
insofar as Middle East regimes are concerned, to the executive branch.
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